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ABSTRACT 
 
 Muslim culture and society has been a part of the Philippine islands in spite of 
nearly ninety-five percent of the population being Christian (a majority Catholic), yet did 
not become a separatist movement until the 1970’s. Since then, the two main separatist 
groups the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) have been battling the Philippine government.  The parties entered truces in 
1996 and 2001, yet there has been a cycle of violence continues.  The Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG), linked to Al Qaeda, emerged in 1990 and has launched many attacks on the 
Christian Philippine majority.  The prolonged Muslim unrest in the ARMM has left 
thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.  The main objective of this research 
paper is to examine Philippine economic and political development and its impact on 
Philippine Muslim unrest. 
 This paper presents a critical analysis of the economic and political development 
and Philippine Muslim unrest by examining six major features of the Philippines; they 
are:  The historical evolution, economic development, political development, socio-
cultural setting, geographic setting, and the quality of life of the Filipino people.  This 
research also examines Fareed Zakaria’s illiberal democracies theory, liberal 
institutionalism, and the Marxist theory of class revolution and primarily relies on 
research conducted at the University of the Philippines and from Philippine and Asian 
scholars.  By taking a holistic comprehensive approach and by using international 
relations theory, this research fills two gaps in the literature about Philippine Muslim 
iv 
unrest.  The research concludes with a look at future challenges, both short term and long 
term that face the country, as well as, possible future scenarios.   
 The findings of this research are that the economic and political development and 
the historical evolution, though major contributory factors, are not the sole reason for the 
prolonged Philippine Muslim unrest.  The most pervasive causal factor to Muslim unrest 
was the socio-cultural setting.  Because of the all-pervasive nature of culture; at first 
glance, the socio-cultural setting was not a major apparent cause.  At almost all times 
examined throughout this research, certain cultural tendencies guided decisions and 
altered the course of events more so than any other single variable.  Corruption, crony 
capitalism, patrimonialism, and irrational institutions all stem from the tendencies of 
Philippine culture must be addressed to find lasting peace in the country.  A move toward 
rational legal institutions and liberal constitutionalism, will lead the way to the creation of 
a liberal democracy and break the cycle of violence occurring in the Philippines. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Muslim culture and society has been a part of Philippine culture, in spite of nearly 
ninety-five percent of the population being Christian (a majority Catholic).  Since the 
1970s this relatively peaceful part of the Philippine population has been marked with 
increased violence and an ongoing guerilla and political separatist movement.1 Without 
understanding the relationship between Philippine economic and political development 
and Philippine Muslims, the protracted cycle of violence and futility of the conflict will 
continue to act as a major barrier to regional and national peace.   
One obstacle for Philippine development has been political and economic turmoil 
and has created a government incapable of effectively addressing Philippine Muslim 
unrest.  Creating an environment for stable economic growth is a daunting one.2  The 
Philippine Muslim community was a thriving community during the era of Spanish 
colonialism but grew increasingly marginalized all the way through to the American 
period of rule.3  After independence, the country’s dramatic economic slowdown and 
underdevelopment, compared to its Asian neighbors, sharply contrasted its initial success 
and respected status post World War II. 4  This, coupled with an authoritarian President 
during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, caused the Philippine economic performance to slow.  At 
the same time, its Southeast Asian neighbors’ economies blossomed, leaving the 
Philippines as one of the most underperforming economies in the region.  During this 
time, there was an emergence of a Philippine Muslim separatist movement and the 
creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  This research looks at the 
political and economic development and its affect on Muslim unrest in the Philippines.    
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Research Design 
 This research has five chapters: an introduction, historical evolution, economic 
and political development, other factors considered, and a conclusion.  The introduction 
will examine the methodology and concepts of the research, as well as, the importance of 
the case study.  Additionally, in order to successfully analyze the impact of these factors 
on Philippine Muslim unrest, international relations (IR) theory will be examined.  The 
second chapter looks at the role of Philippine historical evolution in the Philippine 
Muslim community.  Much of the remnants of the conflict that are seen today are from 
historical differences that originated from the colonial period.   
 This chapter will look specifically at the Spanish and American colonizing eras 
and Philippine Muslim history.  The third chapter on economic and political development 
will chronicle the ups and downs of the Philippine economy and the political events that 
triggered or exacerbated those peaks and falls.  Those events will be analyzed in context 
of Philippine Muslim activity. Chapter four will examine other contributing factors such 
as the socio-cultural setting, the geographic setting, and the quality of life in the 
Philippines.  The conclusion will summarize the findings of the research and look at 
future challenges, both short-term and long-term, and possible future scenarios.   
 
Methodology 
The main objective of this qualitative research is to examine the cause(s) of the 
protracted Philippine Muslim unrest.  This paper looks at the Philippine economic and 
political development and its impact on Philippine Muslims in the region now known as 
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the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The hypothesis examined in 
this research is that Philippine political and economic development negatively affects 
Philippine Muslim unrest.   
 The independent variable in this research is economic and political development 
and my dependent variable is Philippine Muslim unrest.  The relationship between these 
variables is somewhat strong.  This paper presents a critical analysis of affect of the 
economic and political development on Philippine Muslim unrest and explores the 
relationship of four other independent variables.  Those variables are the historical 
evolution, the socio-cultural setting, the geographic setting, and the quality of life of the 
Filipino people.  As Philippine political and economic development has increased, 
Philippine Muslim unrest has decreased; therefore making the relationship between the 
variables negative.   
For this research, economic development and political development will be 
combined into one category because of the intertwined nature of both of the two concepts 
in the Philippines.  As Richard Kessler states in Rebellion and Repression in the 
Philippines, Philippine culture encourages a virulent struggle for power amongst 
individuals as they “fight to raise their status.”  Because of this, Kessler claims that, “The 
Elites become skilled at distributing benefits rather than at promoting social change 
because change alters the balance of power in society,” continuing that, “politics and 
economics have become intertwined in the Philippines.”5 
To successfully analyze the impact of these factors on Philippine Muslim unrest, 
three international relations (IR) theories will be explored.  Future challenges, both short-
term and long-term, will also be examined.  This investigation relies on first hand 
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research conducted at the two most prominent Philippine Universities, the University of 
the Philippines at Diliman and Ateneo de Manila University and relies heavily on 
secondary sources from Philippine and Asian scholars. 
 The theoretical importance of finding the underlying causes for Philippine 
Muslim unrest are quite significant.  The main objective of this research paper is to 
examine Philippine economic and political development and its impact on Philippine 
Muslim unrest in the region now known as the ARMM.  Philippine Muslims have been a 
long-established part of the Philippine country, even though they only make up five 
percent of the predominantly Catholic country.  It was only after a period of economic 
underdevelopment and increased ostracism that this became a separatist movement, 
calling for what is called the Bangsamoro Republik.6  Since the creation of the MNLF in 
the early 1970s there has been a cycle of conflict that has left thousands dead and 
hundreds of thousands displaced.  The only way to break this protracted cycle of violence 
and the futile killing of innocent civilians is to address the root causes for the Philippine 
Muslim unrest.  This research has significant importance to regional and national peace, 
economic and political development, and Philippine Muslim integration. 
 The policy importance of this research is also very significant.  If the underlying 
factors of why Philippine Muslim unrest are more understood then steps to curb that 
unrest can be taken.  With economic and political development comes an increased 
amount of resources the government has at its disposal.  Unfortunately, the inverse is true 
as well.  By approaching this issue in a holistic manner, a clearer picture of the major 
barriers to national peace will be gained. 
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Literature Review 
 The amount of literature on the topic of Philippine economic and political 
development and Philippine Muslim unrest is relatively small.  Because of the limited 
nature of the literature, most sources come from authors in of the Philippines.   
 Wilfred M. Torres III looks at the state of conflict in Mindanao in his 2007 book 
Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  Torres examines the 
Philippine tradition of rido, or feuding clans or families characterized with violence and 
retaliation.  Rido is just one aspect in a multifaceted web of violence in the ARMM and 
compounds the tenuous Muslim separatist movement.  The layered nature of the 
Philippine Muslim community has made it difficult for the Philippine government to 
properly address the long-standing conflict and Muslim unrest.  Torres gives examples of 
the escalation of rido showing how small clan disputes can have major military 
implications; in some cases even involving the AFP, MILF, or MNLF.  Torres’ theories 
have major implications for conflict management in Mindanao because of the widespread 
impact of rido and its intertwined nature with the separatist conflict.  Violence erupting 
from rido can strain relations between separatist negotiations.  Torres takes a wide view 
of the factors that contribute to the clan violence in the south, spreading the blame 
between cultural concepts of shame and honor, the formation of clans and groups of 
allies, the lack of legal provision overseeing arms proliferation, and the lack of respected 
mediators. Torres’ work allows for deeper understanding of the nature of the conflict in 
Mindanao.   
 Walden Bello, et al. in the 2004 book The Anti-Development State, looks at how 
the Philippine political system is mired in unproductive competition between elite 
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factions.  Bello is a Marxist and subsequently much of his exploration is concerned with 
finding the hidden workings of the global economy and the distinction between the core, 
periphery and semi-periphery; he also mentions the negative effects of illiberal 
democracies.  Unless the political development of the Philippines can accommodate and 
fairly integrate both the ruling class and the laboring class, discontent is inevitable.  Bello 
contends that this competition creates a system that is unwilling and unable to 
meaningfully address Philippine social inequality.  The solution proposed is similar to 
development theorists who advocate increased state intervention combined with a 
revamping of the governmental system.  He advocates the creation of a state without 
crony capitalism and neoliberalism and refutes the claim that corruption is the main cause 
for the crisis in the country; citing examples of South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia.7  Bello claims that regional cooperation and an emphasis on domestic 
economic growth can change the Philippine system.   
 In 2003, Arsenio Balisacan and Hal Hill wrote the comprehensive The Philippine 
Economic: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Though economic in nature, 
Balisacan does highlight the challenges that the Philippines faces. Balisacan examines all 
major aspects of the Philippine economy development, including looking at challenges 
that face the country.  The major challenges outlined by the authors are the infrastructure 
needs, highly politicized regime changes, population and fertility growth rates that are 
higher than its regional neighbors, corporate governance, and the conflict in Mindanao.  
Balisacan highlights that the insecurity and destruction caused by the conflict can greatly 
damage the Philippines’ international reputation and inhibit economic growth.  He does 
not go into much detail about how to solve the Muslim Mindanao conflict.   
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 Eric N. Budd, examines the ineffective nature of patrimonial states in creating 
lasting development and an environment conducive to entrepreneurship in his 2000 
article “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States:  The Philippines 
and Indonesia.”  By comparing the Philippines to its neighbor Indonesia, Budd is able to 
narrow down the major obstacles to development, finding that the patrimonial nature of 
the Philippines creates unaccountable and unproductive institutions.  The author claims 
that because of the uncertain nature of patrimonial states, entrepreneurship and 
international investment are not encouraged.  Budd’s solution is to increase the state’s 
capacity by the creation of ration-legal institutions that would provide an environment 
encouraging to economic entrepreneurship and international investment.  This, in turn, 
would promote economic development and overall state growth. 
 Nathan G. Quimpo in his 2000 article “Back to War in Mindanao: The weakness 
of a power-based approach in conflict resolution,” outlines the usage of the three conflict 
resolution approaches (power-based, rights-based, and interest-based) employed in the 
conflict between the Philippine government and the MNLF and the MILF.  Outlining 
examples where rights-based and interest-based approaches were overlooked and the 
power-based approach employed, Quimpo shows the destructive nature of this approach.  
Quimpo advocates a shift to rights and interest-based approaches to break the cycle of 
interaction between the Philippine government and the Muslim separatists.     
 Cecar Adib Majul is one of the most prominent and respected academics 
addressing Philippine Muslim issues.  Coming from a Philippine Muslim background, 
Majul, in the 1999 book Muslims in the Philippines, takes a historical look at the 
evolution of the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao.  Much attention is paid to the 
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historical development of Islam in the Philippines and the community’s resistance to 
Spanish colonial rule.  Majul also examines how the culture of Islam strengthened the 
resolve of the Philippine Muslims to resist their colonizers.  Often looked down upon, 
Philippine Muslim culture is celebrated by Majul.  He notes that the frequently prized 
Philippine values of cultural independence and identity are best exemplified by the plight 
of the Muslims in Mindanao as they never gave way or relented to outside conquerors.  
Majul hopes that the future for the Philippines would broaden to create a common 
pluralist history of the people of the Philippines.  Majul also wrote, with the help of 
Ralph Salmi, the 1999 book Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices, 
which examines peaceful conflict resolution techniques suggested by Islam as a way to 
bridge the gap between perception and the reality of Muslim practices.  The authors show 
that there are peaceful recommendations for conflict resolution through Islam.  
 Lynn M. Kwiatkowski focuses on a very specific aspect of Philippine 
development and conflict in her 1998 book Struggling with Development: The politics of 
hunger and gender in the Philippines.  In the context of Philippine political violence, 
Kwiatkowski examines hunger, poverty, and gender.  The author looks at Philippine 
development as a class struggle and questions the efficacy of international based efforts 
to address the needs of the impoverished.  Kwiatkowski advocates grass-roots efforts to 
development the Philippines.  
 Arnold Molina Azurin’s 1996 Beyond the Cult of Dissidence, tried to explain the 
conflict as remnants of the ethnic and tribal past and war profiteering.  His major example 
is the division between the Hutus and Tutsis during and up to the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.  He contends that though ethnicity and tribalism are most commonly blamed 
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for this conflict, Azurin points to struggles between factions in the ruling class and their 
struggle for power.8  He highlights the class struggle and antagonism between the rule 
and the ruling and also points to long-remembered grievances as significant factors in the 
genocide. His solution for the dispute is to move it more towards a people to people 
approach looking at people’s security rather than national security.  He calls for more 
involvement of the people in order to create communication link between the two parties.   
 Richard J. Kessler, in his 1989 book Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, 
outlines the cultural barriers that pose a major obstacle to Philippine development.  The 
author takes a critical stance on the elements of Philippine behavior, highlighting topics 
such as favoring kinship circles, utang na loόb, creating “in” and “out” groups, and 
corruption.  He states, “The (Philippine) culture tends to isolate groups; rather than 
bridging social gulfs it increases social distance, with cooperation among individuals 
intensifying rather than reducing conflict between individual alliances.”9  Kessler talks 
about the hierarchical structure of the society and how it creates an environment of 
competition.  These two factors stand in the way of development.  The author believes in 
the possibility of change by looking at the historical development of the national identity 
of the Philippines.  He points to a longstanding tradition of independence and pride that 
can eventually bring both communities together under a united Philippine state. 
 
Research in Existent Literature 
 There is separate literature about Philippine economic and political development 
and literature about Philippine Muslim unrest; however, there are only a few pieces of 
literature that attempt to connect the two concepts.  Azurin explores class struggle within 
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the country and its effect on unrest and violence.   Budd examine economic development 
and pays special attention to the nature of patrimonial states.  Balisacan takes a very 
thorough look at the economic development and the political aspects that surround it and 
makes connections to the impact of that to Muslim unrest.  Bello, looks at political 
development and its effect on the class system as a way to explain the conflict in the 
ARMM.  All of these authors analyze the Philippine Muslim conflict by taking a specific 
approach, while other authors analyze the conflict in an even more specific manner. 
Torres looks at the cultural factors that make the violence in the Muslim region complex 
and challenging to understand by looking at a Philippine Muslim tradition of rido, or 
family feuding.  Quimpo examines the conflict approaches, Kwiatkowski looks at 
inequality with special emphasis on gender issues.  Majul emphasizes the historical past, 
both economic and social, as an explaining factor for the uniqueness and posture of the 
Philippine Muslims, while Kessler observes the cultural factors that have played a role in 
the prolonged conflict.   
 There are two major gaps in the literature that this research fills.  First, this 
research takes holistic comprehensive approach.  By examining six country features, as 
well as, looking IR theory the most wide-ranging picture of the situation in the 
Philippines is obtained.  Secondly, this research applies IR theories to explain the conflict 
in the country.  No other piece of literature that I have found examines IR theory 
specifically in relation to the Philippine conflict.  Considered in this research are Fareed 
Zakaria’s illiberal democracies theory, liberal institutionalism, and the Marxist theory of 
class revolution.  Many authors cite class revolution as a cause of the conflict but none of 
them are able to completely connect it to the situation in the country.   
11 
 
Philippine Muslim Unrest 
 Philippine Muslim unrest in this research will focus on Muslim action; which can 
either be political, military, or social.  The Philippine Muslim community remained 
isolated and as a distinctly unique community for centuries as it successfully repelled 
Spanish rule through six Moro Wars.  Since the independence of the Philippines in 1946, 
Mindanao has been under the oversight of the Philippine government.  The Philippine 
government, with its multitude of deficiencies including weak rural infrastructure, a 
decentralized state, and a dependency on the US, would lead to weak and ineffectual 
governance and an inability to develop the rural Mindanao area.  Failed development 
plans and resettlement initiatives left the Muslim community with government initiatives 
that were unfocused and had little follow through.  An influx of settlers led to a disparate 
growth of land ownership between Philippine Christians and Muslims and created the 
strains between the two communities.  In many ways, Philippine Muslims have not had 
an equal share of the Philippine national development.  Failed development plans, broken 
promises, years of warring, unbalanced taxation, and feelings of being dealt with in less 
than a fair manner have left the Philippine Muslim community in search of lasting 
answers.  The issues causing Muslim unrest and how to move toward substantive 
solutions will be examined throughout this research. 
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Figure 1: Map of Philippines - Mindanao 
 
 Philippine Muslim society, located mainly in the southern islands of Mindanao (as 
seen in the map above), having many of the same features of other Islamic societies, has 
been organized into families and tribal structures.  Tribes such as the Maranaw, Tausug, 
Yakan, Sama/Samal, Sangil, Iranun, and Maguindanao and families such as Dimaporo 
and Marohombsar hold major political, social, and economic influence.10  Family 
warring, known as rido, is quite prevalent.11  Killings, intimidation, and forms of 
violence mark these family feuds.  The Philippine Muslim culture values individuals who 
defend their family name and uphold family honor.  This contributes to the often 
protracted nature of these conflicts.  Most often these disputes are settled by the tribe or 
13 
family that has the most political affiliations.  It can also end if the violence escalates to 
an unacceptable level; in which case these conflicts peacefully end through a ceasefire 
tradition called kanduri, or family feasts where public apologies are traded.12  
 
 
Figure 2: Close Map of Mindanao 
 
 The concept of rido has a significant impact on the state of Philippine Muslim 
unrest and much of the violence in the region stems from this type of conflict.  According 
to Torres, “While the Muslim-Christian conflict in Mindanao dominates the attention of 
international and local press, clan conflicts are actually more pertinent in the daily lives 
of the people.”13  The tribal structuring of society came about as a necessary product of 
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nomadic tribes.  In this environment of competition for limited resources, and without 
large governing institutions, these tribal traditions were the best way to protect and ensure 
the survival of each community.  Their relevance in the southern part of the Philippines is 
still significant, especially in light of the weak nature of the Philippine government.   
 
Importance of Case Study 
The Philippines has many unique features that make it an extremely useful case 
study, particularly in terms of American security.  Some of those unique features are that 
the country is majority Christian and is addressing a militant Muslim minority, it is a 
democratic country based on the American political system, it has had relative economic 
stability since its independence, and its European and American colonial history.  
Certainly not least of the concerns is the addressing of the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism.    
 The Philippines is majority non-Muslim country with over ninety percent of its 
population being Christian and is the most heavily proportioned Catholic country in Asia.  
In proportion, it has slightly more Catholics than the US at less than a fourth of the 
population being Catholic.  The Christian and Catholic similarities between the 
Philippines, the US, and much of Europe make it a significant case study when looking at 
the difference between Islamic and non-Islamic countries.  Muslim separatist and 
independence movements pose a major challenge to international, regional, and domestic 
security for the US and have been witnessed in such places as Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, 
China, and throughout the Caspian Sea region.  The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has ties to 
Al-Qaeda while there have also been rumors of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operating in the 
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Philippines.  The Philippines was mentioned as an area of interest by the US in the 2001 
US War on Terror.   
 The Philippines is a democratic country and has been since its independence in 
1946.  Much of its political system is based off the American model that was adopted 
from its previous colonizers.  The Philippine Constitution is very similar to that of the 
American Constitution. The Philippine political structure is very similar to the American 
structure in that it consists of executive, legislative, and judicial branches.  It does, 
however, have some very distinct differences.  The Philippine culture greatly affects the 
political system and creates an executive branch that is much more robust and far-
reaching in its set of powers, compared to that of the American system.  This gives the 
president power to allocate resources to further their own economic or political 
agendas.14  On the flip side, when things go wrong within the society, the people blame 
the president’s administration – as seen with the removal of Marcos in 1986.   
  The Philippines has had relative economic stability.  Immediately following 
independence, the Philippines enjoyed great economic success mainly due to its 
substantial market ties with the US. 15 Since then, the country’s economic performance 
has slowed, yet has remained relatively stable in times of regional market crises.  One 
such example was its stability, in relation to its neighbors, during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis.16  The reasonably stable economy, insulated from major peaks and 
spikes, makes the Philippines a more attractive case study. 
 The Philippine colonial history also gives the Philippines importance because it 
shares many cultural, social, and political similarities to the US and Europe.  The 
Philippines is very unique because of its western colonial influences.  Though it is an 
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Asian country, it has much less Indian and Chinese influence that its neighbor’s and more 
similarities to European and American societies.  The Spanish colonizers left an indelible 
mark on Philippine culture, ruling the Philippines for almost 350 years, from 1565 to 
1898.  The US ruled the Philippines from 1898 to 1946 and established much of the 
economic, political, educational, and military institutions that are seen today.17  The soft 
influence of the nearly fifty-year rule of the US can be seen quite pervasively throughout 
the culture; including the wide-spread use of English throughout the country.  Since its 
independence in 1946, the Philippines has been a close political, economic, and military 
ally to the US.  
 
International Relations Theory 
 A brief consideration of IR theory will provide the backbone of analysis and 
explanation of the conflict.  These theories can be applied to the understanding of the 
political and economic policies and the findings throughout this research.  This section 
will examine three relevant schools of thought in IR.  They are Fareed Zakaria’s illiberal 
democracies theory, liberal institutionalism, and Marxist theory.  
 
Illiberal Democracies  
 Political scientist Fareed Zakaria writes about the democratizing process 
throughout the world, claiming that there is a major distinction between liberal 
democracies (US, France, UK, and most of Western Europe) and illiberal democracies 
(the Philippines, Iran, Valenzuela, Zimbabwe, and the like).  Zakaria believes that there 
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are two key lessons that can be taken from successful experiments with democracy; they 
are to “emphasize genuine economic development” and to “build effective political 
institutions.”18  Constitutional liberalism, is more about the government’s goals rather 
than merely the electoral process.  Liberal because of its emphasis on individual liberty, 
and constitutional because it depends on the rule of law; constitutional liberalism “seeks 
to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source – 
state, church, or society.”19 
 The US is a major champion of the spreading of democracy and, though Zakaria 
believes in the democratic ideology, he doubts the effectiveness of democracy in 
countries that do not protect liberal values.  Zakaria questions whether or not a country is 
democratic merely by conducting an election.  Though, elections can give a regime 
greater legitimacy, when analyzed solely on its democratic governance many fall 
dramatically short.  The ironic aspect of the US advocating a democracy at all costs 
system around the world is that for the US, the distinguishing factor is “not how 
democratic it is but rather how undemocratic it is.”20  The main emphasis in the US 
system is a focus on individual rights – as seen in the Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights is 
a list of rights that the US government cannot take away from the individual no matter 
what and despite of the will of a majority.  The important element in the US democratic 
system is the institutionalized limitation on the elected majority; this ensures minority 
rights and liberal freedom for all citizens.  The protection of individual rights is not seen 
in illiberal democracies.  In most cases, the opposite is true, where the rule and wishes of 
the majority can isolate and marginalize minority groups.  James Madison and the 
founding fathers of the American Constitution warned about the dangers of the majority.  
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Zakaria points out, “In many of the developing countries, the experience of democracy 
over the past few decades has been one in which majorities have – often quietly, 
sometimes nosily – eroded separations of power, undermined human rights, and 
corrupted long-standing traditions of tolerance and fairness.”21   
 Zakaria points to examples of having a democratically elected government that 
elect radicals, extremists, racists, or fascists to government positions.  All of this is under 
the umbrella of democracy.  In these environments, elections “merely legitimize power 
grabs” and much more resemble dictatorships than democracies.22  Zakaria states, 
“Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power; democracy is about the 
accumulation and use.”23 As he points out, there is a distinction between liberal 
democracies that limit the power of government and ensure the rights of the minority 
groups and illiberal democracies that accumulate and use government power to represent 
the majority will or for the rich to accrue further wealth. 
 Governments that take over by force (or rule by force) do not create efficient, 
stable societies.  In actuality, Zakaria believes that a strong government is contradictory 
in many ways to an effective government.  The US model of governance is one of limited 
governmental powers that support an effective state.  In spite of this, Western scholars 
and specialists have advocated the creation of centralized and strong governments in 
these developing countries.  Leaders in these illiberal democracies claim that a 
centralizing of authority is needed to break down feudal ties, split traditional coalitions 
and allegiances, and to bring an overall order to an otherwise turbulent society.24  The 
incorrect assumption here is that an all powerful government is an effective, legitimate 
government.  Contrarily, Zakaria states, “Governments that are limited, and thus seen as 
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legitimate, can usually maintain order and pursue tough policies, albeit slowly, by 
building coalitions.”25  To underline this point, Zakaria looks at tax-collection rates as a 
test for legitimacy.  Tax collection, which requires individual’s observance to laws, is 
dreadfully low in developing countries.  Zakaria points to this an example of the lack of 
legitimacy of policy and governance in illiberal democracies.  
 Illiberal democracies deal with social issues markedly different than liberal 
democracies.  One misnomer is that democracy brings about ethnic peace and harmony.  
This is not always the case, Zakaria states, “Mature liberal democracies can usually 
accommodate ethnic divisions without violence or terror and live in peace with other 
liberal democracies,”26  Illiberal democracies, on the other hand, can incite conflict and 
war because of the lack of institutional protections of individual rights.  Zakaria points to 
scholars Rabushka and Shepsle who looked at Asian democracies in the 1960’s and who, 
thought their research, believed that the democracy “is simply not viable in an 
environment of intense ethnic preferences.”27  In environments where liberal 
constitutionalism is not present, the democracy seen can often give rise to exaggerated 
nationalism and war-mongering.  
 Illiberal democracies can sometimes stem from an abundance of “unearned” 
wealth.  Countries that benefit from their richness in resources – which can be through oil 
reserves, agriculture, or mineral – have a difficult time developing into stable liberal 
democracies because of the injection of wealth into the developmental system.  With this 
“unearned” wealth, comprehensive development such as growth in the bureaucratic 
system, political institutions, legal institutions, industrial sector, and infrastructure is not 
a top priority.  If the goal of a government is to accrue resources and gather wealth, then 
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Zakaria states, “In a country with no resources, for the state to get rich, society has to get 
rich so that the government can then tax this wealth.”28  
 Zakaria believes that the spread of illiberal democracies is one of the most 
dangerous threats that challenges the international world.  This spread undermines the 
legitimacy of liberal democracies and the values they espouse.  The US and other liberal 
democracies should, instead of looking for new frontiers to have the roots of democracy 
take hold, look to encourage the rise of constitutional liberalism around the world.   
Zakaria states, “Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, 
but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic 
divisions, and even war.”29   
 
Liberal Institutionalism 
 Liberal institutionalism reinforces the illiberal democracies theory outlined above 
by emphasizing the importance of institutions as a way to create and maintain peace.  
Liberalism has significantly shaped the way that political relationships have been viewed 
since the late seventeenth century and is based on the ideals of the belief of human 
progression.  Liberalist theory states that human nature can be perfectible; and in order to 
achieve that perfection, democracy and democratic institutions are crucial.  John Baylis 
states that, contrary to the realist ideology, “Liberals seek to project values of order, 
liberty, justice, and toleration into international relations.”30  Liberals doubt that war is a 
natural state of politics and that the state is the sole actor in IR.  Baylis states, “Although 
they do not deny that it (the state as the main actor in the world political stage) is 
important…they do see multinational corporations, transnational actors such as terrorist 
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groups, and international organizations as central actors in some issue-areas of world 
politics.”31  Liberals see the state not as one single entity, but rather as a collection of 
individual bureaucracies.  Each of these individual bureaucracies carries their own batch 
of interests which makes it nearly impossible for the state to act as one a unitary, single-
interest actor.  Baylis states, “There can be no such thing as a national interest, since it 
merely represents the result of whatever bureaucratic organizations dominate the 
domestic decision-making process.”32  Because cooperation is emphasized, the ability to 
create systems and situations that cooperation can be achieved is of extreme importance.  
Though military force is an important factor, equally important are social issues of 
environmental stewardship and economic prosperity.  According to Baylis, “Order in 
world politics emerges not from a balance of power but from the interactions between 
many layers of governing arrangements, comprising laws, agreed norms, international 
regimes, and institutional rules.”33   
 Liberal institutionalism contends that conflict is unnecessary, avoidable, and an 
out-of-date way of handling disagreements.34  This is reinforced through the creation and 
belief that international and domestic institutions can act as efficient ways to settle 
disputes that would have previously escalated to violence.  There are two levels of 
analysis in liberal institutionalism when looking at the causes of conflict and the 
determinants of peace; they are human nature and the state.  On the individual human 
level, the cause of conflict is government intervention disturbing the natural order.  The 
factors of peace are individual prosperity, free trade, and individual liberty.  On the state 
level, the cause of conflict is the undemocratic nature of politics and balance of power 
and the factors of peace are the government’s ability to respond to public sentiment. 35  
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Baylis states, “Domestic and international institutions are required to protect and nurture 
these values.” 36  The extent and efficacy of these institutions can vary greatly, 
significantly altering the capability for these institutions to be a means to avoid conflict.  
The lack of institutional integrity does not allow for public opinion to be addressed in a 
legal way; and thus sets the foundation for Marxist revolution theory.   
 
Marxism 
 Throughout the history of IR theory, the consideration of economic factors, and 
the study of those factors, has had notable significance.  It is implied in many IR theories 
that the rising of the quality of life and living standards, because of economic 
development, will inherently bring domestic and eventually international peace.  
 Karl Marx, a German political economist, believed that politics are actually the 
creation of economic conflict that produces antagonism between the resource owning 
bourgeoisie and the laboring proletariat within the capitalist economic system.  This struggle 
between two dissimilar classes creates competition between the two groups and eventually 
leads to aggression towards each other.37  Baylis states that, “In this world-economy the most 
important actors are not states but classes, and the behavior of all other actors is ultimately 
explicable by class forces.”38  Marxism, also known as structuralism or world-system 
theory, has been a major influence to international relations for nearly a century and, 
though currently the calls for free-market are now widely accepted, its relevance in 
understanding political systems cannot be understated.  Dougherty states, “Central to 
Marxist theories of imperialism and war is the assumption that all international issues are 
reducible to issues of economic gain rather than political power.”39  Though the Marxist 
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theory dates back to 1848, the Marxist dogma has shown lasting resiliency and aptness 
throughout modern politics.  As a combination of economic theory, social science, 
political philosophy, and history theory; as well as a mix of theology, ethics, and 
revolution theory, it prescribes a secular social arrangement as a solution for the 
eradication of conflict.  Marxism believes that conflict occurs out of a life or death clash 
between socioeconomic classes.  Dougherty states, “Capitalism is the bondage from 
which people strive to be liberated,” and that, “whoever controls the economic system 
also controls the political system.” 40  Marxism believes that class destruction is inherent 
to capitalism where the lower rungs of the middle class are thrust into the proletariat 
laboring class because of the increasing inability to compete with the resources of the 
bourgeoisie ruling class.  As the proletariat class grows in number and the bourgeoisie 
class shrinks in number, the struggle between the two intensifies and comes to a boiling 
point.  Marx anticipates a sequence of intensifying conflicts that leads to an eventual 
overthrowing of the ruling class.  
 Marxism views all political events as being influenced by economic concerns; 
including all reason that are religious, cultural, social, humanitarian, and militaristic. The 
Marxism image of lasting peace is best described as, “the peace of the self-alienated 
person restored as a result of the ‘negation of the negation,’ the revolutionary self-
appropriation by the proletariat, taking that which rightfully belongs to itself.”41 For 
Marxists, peace can only be achieved by addressing the wealth disparity that is created in 
capitalism.  Marxists point to the extremes in wealth disparity and resource ownership as 
the indicators for potential social unrest.  In the Philippines, there is a conflict between two 
dissimilar classes; the ruling and wealthier Catholic urban center of Manila and the rural 
Muslim ARMM.  
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
 
The historical evolution of the Philippines plays a major role in Philippine 
Muslim unrest.  Philippine historical evolution is unique to many Asian countries and has 
played a significant role in the development of the Philippine Muslim community.  A 
long history of feuding between the colonial rulers and the Philippine Muslims set the 
stage for the independent spirit of the Philippine Muslims.   
 During the Spanish colonization, there were a total of six wars between the 
Muslims and the Spanish known as the Moro Wars.  The Muslim culture has remained 
untouched during the colonial period.  In 1990, the Philippine government created the 
ARMM which is in the south western part of Mindanao, in spite of calls for full national 
sovereignty by the MNLF.  This gave the region control over certain aspects of their 
governance without granting full independence from the Philippine state.   
 History plays an especially significant role in the life of Muslims.  Bernard Lewis 
states, “The Muslim peoples, like everyone else in the world, are shaped by their history, 
but unlike some others, they are keenly aware of it,” continuing, “Islamic history, for 
Muslims, has an important religious and also legal significance, since it reflects the 
working out of God’s purpose for His community.”42  It is this reason why an analysis of 
the historical evolution of the country is especially important. 
 
25 
Philippine History 
The Philippines was a Spanish colony from 1565 to 1898.  In 1898, Philippines 
gained independence from Spain after the Spanish-American War.  In 1935, the 
Philippines became a Commonwealth of the United States.  During that time, Manuel L. 
Quezon was elected president and presided over a decade leading up to Philippine 
independence in 1946.  During World War II, for a four year period from 1942 to 1946, 
the Philippines was under Japanese occupation.  With help from the US, the Philippines 
gained its independence in 1946.  Three more presidents served until President Ferdinand 
Marcos took control from 1965 to 1986.  Events during Marcos’ Administration were the 
declaration of martial law in 1972, Marcos’ opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, 
Jr.’s assassination in 1983, and early presidential elections (also considered illegitimate 
snap elections) in 1985.  These all led to his expulsion through the People Power 
Movement I in 1986, ushering in the Corazon Aquino, Benigno Aquino Jr.’s widow, 
Presidency.  The Aquino era was marred with multiple coup attempts that undermined 
political and economic stability.43  The Fidel Ramos Administration from 1992 to 1998 
was a time of greater economic stability and reform.  In 1998, Joseph “Erap” Estrada was 
elected and served office until he was ousted through People Power Movement II in 
2001.  Estrada’s Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed his position after his 
eviction.  People Power Movement II occurred because of a general malcontent with 
corruption, economic underperformance, and a viewed deviation from pre-election 
promises made by President Estrada.  Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was reelected to a six 
year term in 2004.  Her presidency has also been filled with protests claiming corruptions 
as well as multiple coup attempts and electoral fraud.  
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 The Philippines’ past is a tumultuous history of conquest and resistance.  Its post-
independence history has been fractured by dictator rule and coup attempts.  This turmoil 
is the setting in which Philippine Muslim unrest has manifested.   Further investigation of 
historical evolution will be taken later in this research.  
 
Philippine Muslim History 
  The earliest recorded sign of Islam in the Philippines comes from Sulu 
Genealogy; unfortunately, however, specific dates are difficult to come by.  It is known 
that the first presumed Muslim in the Philippines was located on the Jolo Islands, which 
is today part of the ARMM.44  It is reported that Karimul Makdum built the first mosque 
and is the first confirmed aulia or preacher or missionary in the Philippine islands.  The 
promulgation of Islam, first in the Sulu Islands, is attributed to Abu Bakr an eighteenth 
century Muslim missionary.  During this time, Abu Bakr was given the sultan title in the 
Sulu city of Buansa, which gave the first inclination of an organized Islamic political 
institution in the Philippines.  Abu Bakr, also known as Sharif ul-Hashim, was an Arab 
and spent time in Iraq, Indonesia, and Borneo before setting in Buansa.  From this small 
town, Islam in the Philippines gradually spread.45  
 The Spanish rule began in 1565 and the early centuries were marked by what is 
called the Moro Wars.  In total there were six Moro Wars; four wars from 1565 to 1666 
and two from 1718 to the end of Spanish rule in 1898.  During these centuries, a pattern 
of Spaniard proselytization, Philippine Muslim rejection, trade disputes (which included 
the Dutch, Chinese, and the British), and retaliation through naval and land encounters 
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emerged.  The destruction of the Moro Wars occurred of towns along the Visayan and 
Mindanao Islands while the Muslim male population was also substantially diminished.46 
 Much of the continuing conflict between the Spaniards and the Philippine 
Muslims, especially in toward the end of the eighteenth century, centered on trade and the 
control of the trade routes that winded through the Philippine Islands.  Trade has always 
been very important to the Sulu Islands as practically all non-essential items came from 
outside of the Philippines, including its firearms and military needs.47  Growing 
Philippine dependency on Chinese and Dutch trade and goods developed increasingly 
over this period.  By the mid-eighteen century, British interest in these trade lines 
amplified as they were looking for a more efficient route between India and Britain.  As 
interest in these trade lines increased, so did the incidents of pirating.  Muslim pirates 
consistently harassed Dutch, English, Chinese, and Spanish traders which continued until 
the end of the Spanish colonization period.    
 During this time period the British and Dutch were expanding their influence 
from the Malaysian border.  In order to stem this approach and to secure the southern part 
of the Philippines, the Spanish strategy was to conquer the island of Sulu and to place it 
under their sovereignty. 48 The sixth stage of the Moro War in 1851 saw the Spanish 
invade the island of Sulu.  Fears of Dutch and British expansion, along with burgeoning 
trade between the Philippine Muslims and these two colonial powers reinforced the urge 
for the Spanish to secure its claim over the southern Philippine islands.  The water 
channels of the Philippine islands were crucial for Asian trade.  The Spanish justified 
their use of force by citing the danger of the pirating activities of the Muslims of the Sulu 
islands.  This marked the beginning of the decline of power of the sultans and the rise of 
28 
Spanish influence in the region.  The war quickly took on issues outside of the reason to 
stem British and Dutch expansion and became a war to contain piracy.  The Spanish 
clergy quickly backed the war seeing an opportunity to evangelize and to increase their 
social reach.  During this time, a campaign to distinguish Muslims from Christians made 
the people of Manila to view this war as holy in nature.  One Dominican friar was quoted 
saying, “The war against Jolo is now a just war, a holy war in the name of religion,” 
while one Recollect friar stated, “Go brave Spanish soldier to the combat in the fiery 
arena without fear because you are supported and protected by the fury of the God of the 
armies.”49  The strategy to frame this war as a battle of religion proportions garnished the 
support of the Spanish Manila inhabitants.  The attack on Zamboanga soon ensued.  
Eventually in 1878 a peace treaty between the Sultan and the Spaniards was signed.  For 
the next 20 years, the Spanish gradually spread their influence throughout Mindanao but 
it wasn’t without a violent struggle.  The last five years of Spanish rule saw the frequency 
of conflict increase with hundreds of Spanish soldiers and Muslims losing their lives.50  
 During the Philippine Revolution in 1898, the Spanish began to withdraw from 
their fortifications in the heavily-Muslim interior part of Mindanao.  The void left by the 
soldiers was filled by the regional Muslim datus.  The revolutionaries that were battling 
the Spanish in the North quickly began to court the Philippine Muslims to the Philippines 
independence campaign. Revolutionary war hero Emilio Aguinaldo told the Congress in 
1899, “to negotiate with the Moros of Sulu and Mindanao for purposes of establishing 
national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their 
beliefs and traditions.”51 The revolutionaries relayed stories of the indigenous groups 
(Igorots and Aetas) coming down from the mountains to join the movement toward 
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Philippine independence to the datus of the south with little success.  Majul states, “Most 
of these appeals to the sultans and datus generally fell on deaf ears,” and adds that, “The 
Muslims were determined to retain their own views of independence and liberty.”52  In 
actuality, some of the regions of the south were battling the revolutionaries who were 
attempting to control Zamboanga.  The Philippines was a fractured state when the US 
inherited the country. 
 The modern history of the Philippine Muslim community started from the US 
inheritance of the country around the turn of the 20th century.  Major social and cultural 
inequalities along with significant social fragmentation handicapped the country.  Laid 
upon this fractured society was the newly adopted US political system, the constitution 
and the political structure of the Philippines mirrored that of the US.  In the 
conceptualizing process this seemed to work; however, when put into practice the unique 
cultural tendencies of the Filipinos changed the institutions into entities that were 
distinctly different than their US counterparts.  The Filipino of patrimonial and tribal 
tendencies led to corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and governmental inefficiency.  This 
led to improper policy, poor follow through, and a gradual economic decline that put the 
country far behind its Asian neighbors.  Unsuccessful migration policies lead to wealth 
disparities never seen before in the provinces and in the Mindanao area.  This was the 
environment where violence and unrest first started.   
 In 1969, the creation of the MNLF, started the movement for the Bangsamoro 
Republik.  Over the last few decades there has been a conflict between the Filipino 
government and Muslim separatists that has killed an estimated 6,000 people and has 
accounted for millions of pesos of government expenditure.53  Rebel groups have been 
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fighting in Mindanao to create an Islamic state separate of the Philippine government.  
The people there are called Moro’s originating from the Spanish word Moors and have 
wanted a separate Islamic homeland which they call Bangsamoro.  In 1990, the Filipino 
government created the ARMM which is in the south western part of Mindanao.  This 
gave the region control over certain aspects of their governance; however, security and 
foreign affairs remained under the control of the Philippine Government and is a major 
source of contention between the feuding groups.  The conflict is mainly religious in 
division, where 90 percent of the Filipino population is Catholic and only five percent is 
Muslim, the latter being mainly isolated to the southern islands. 
In 1996, MNLF signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government that 
was subsequently rejected by the MILF just three months later.  This spurred on a series 
of armed conflicts between the MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  
During the period leading up the Estrada Administration in 1998, hundreds of people 
were killed because of the conflict, while thousands were displaced.  In March 2000, 
President Estrada, after failed ceasefires declared “All-Out War” with the MILF and by 
July controlled most of Camp Abubakar - the main MILF stronghold.54  The Tripoli 
Peace Agreement was signed in June 2001, but by 2003, clashes and attacks lead to a 
large-scale military operation in Central Mindanao.  By this time, the number of 
displaced people reached near half a million. Today, the number reaches nearly a million 
Filipino citizens displaced.  Another aspect of this conflict is the ASG which is 
responsible for kidnappings and terrorist bombings.  Being linked directly to Al-Qaeda, 
this group poses a major concern for not only the Philippine government but regional and 
international powers as well.55 
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In 2002 allegations tied JI to the MILF after the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, 
Indonesia which killing 200 people.  The connection was rebuked by the MILF.  In 2004, 
the IMT team arrived in the country consisting 60 members from Malaysia and Brunei.  
They were charged with overseeing the ceasefire between the two parties.  The group’s 
mandate ended in August and the Malaysian government announced its withdrawal from 
the project. 56 Another group that emerged was the 2005 AHJAG.  This group is a way 
for the Philippine government and the MILF to share intelligence on terrorist activities in 
a way to limit accidental clashes between the two parties.  US assistance (in the form of 
military training) for the Philippine government was a part of the US Operation Enduring 
Freedom campaign starting in 2001, with the deployment of 650 US military personnel.57  
The US focus was mainly on the ASGs ties to Indonesian jihadis and has dwindled in 
light of the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent war in Iraq.58 
 The conflict has continued with spats of violence keeping both parties on edge.  In 
August 2007, clashes between military and Moro guerillas left 83 people dead.59  Within 
the ten months prior, there were ten Marines and seven Christian government 
construction workers that were abducted and beheaded by the rebels.  As recently as early 
February 2008, skirmishes between the Philippine police and MILF have been 
recorded.60  Philippine Muslim leaders have tried to bring their plight to the international 
stage, seeking Islamic country’s backing; however, there has been little international 
intervention and attention brought upon this situation.    
Filipino Muslims are in many ways carrying on the tradition of their Moro 
ancestors by continuing to resist outside influence of other cultures.  Many Muslim 
Filipinos prefer not to be considered Filipino because of the fact that their culture never 
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relinquished its sovereignty to the Spanish King Philip.  The Muslim Philippine history is 
vastly different than the Christian Philippines and still plays a role in the prolonged unrest 
seen in the Muslim community. 
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The economic and political development of the Philippines has been intertwined 
throughout the history of the country.  As you will see, many of the economic crises were 
spurred on by political turmoil.  Conversely, many times political turmoil would inhibit 
economic growth and success.   
Philippine development has posed a major puzzle for economists and political 
scientists, alike.  Its dramatic economic slowdown and underdevelopment compared to its 
Asian neighbors sharply contrasts its success and respected status post World War II.  In 
the 1950s, the Philippine economy was one of the most robust and stable in Southeast 
Asia and had one of the highest per capita incomes and average GDP growth rate in the 
region.61  Gradually, Philippine economic performance began to slow while at the same 
time its Southeast Asian neighbor’s economies blossomed, making it one of the most 
underperforming economies in the region.  The initial economic conditions of the 
Philippines were relatively favorable compared to other newly independent countries.  
The Philippines colonial rule was relatively benevolent and was the basis for its 
economic success in the immediate decade after its independence.62  Its close ties to the 
United States allowed for advantaged access to the world’s healthiest market, while 
reparations from the US propelled the Philippine economy.   
 Philippine politics greatly affected Philippine development and performance and 
has been one of the major reasons the Philippine economy has been relatively lethargic 
and slow moving compared to neighbors within the Asian region.  Sometimes referred to 
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as Philippine national sport or the national pastime politics and political institutions are 
the most influential institutions in Philippine life.63   
     
Economics 
The 1950s were a period of Philippine economic superiority in the region with an 
average GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent, as seen in the chart below.  During this era, the 
economic growth and production rivaled that of Japan.  The Philippines’ economic woes 
began to form during the Marcos Administration in 1965. 
 The Philippines was almost entirely left out of regional Asian growth starting 
from the late 1970s (all the way to the early 1990s).  The 1980s was the Philippine’s 
worst performing economic decade, referred to by Arsenio Balisacan and Hal Hill as the 
“lost decade” that really set the Philippines back (compared to its East Asian neighbors).  
During this time its average annual GDP growth was a mere 1.0 percent.64  This was 
followed up by less than stellar GDP growth of 3.2 percent in the 1990s, as the figure 
below illustrates. 
 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP 
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The underperformance of the Philippine economy in the 1980s was spurred on by the 
events of that occurred in the 1970s.  These events set the stage for what was to be 
referred to as the “lost decade.”   
The 1970s was a decade of moderately high growth in the Philippines at 6.3 
percent annual GDP growth rate.  Unfortunately, it was also a time of large foreign 
borrowing, a factor that will effect the growth of the economy in the years to come.65  
GDP growth hit its peak in 1977, then declined steadily soon after when the strategy of 
foreign borrowing proved to be unsustainable.  In large part, this was due to the misuse of 
the loans and borrowings from foreign sources.  This also marked the start of an era of 
increasing commodity dependence which left the stability of the Philippine economy 
vulnerable to fluctuating international markets.  The Philippines was struggling with a 
balance of payments challenge, as well as, economic shocks from the 1979 oil crisis.  The 
1980s was a difficult time for the nation.  The period from 1984 to 1986 was a time of 
economic stagnation, culminating in the political turmoil of EDSA I People Power 
Movement of 1986.66  This led to the Philippines’ largest economic downturn and 
marked a decade of its poorest economic performance.  The effects of this decade are still 
plaguing the country today.   
Immediately after the People Power Movement I, the Philippines struggled 
through an attempted recovery phase.  All of these factors saw the Philippines take a 
gradually less significant role in the region’s investment and trade flow. 67 This sub par 
GDP growth caused the Philippines to begin to lag in many social indicators as compared 
to its high growth neighbors.  In the early 1990s, determined economic reform policy was 
implemented and saw a slight valuation of the peso, moderate regional growth, positive 
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movements in trade, and a mild return of foreign investment.  Political crisis again 
plagued the Philippines in 1992, and the year to follow, but this time it was of a much 
lesser extent than the mid 1980s.  Serious power outages, early coup attempts in early 
1990s, the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 and the recovery aftermath, as well as the 
removal of U.S. military installations in 1992 all lead to a notable economic downturn.68  
Moreover, in 1990 the Philippine peso experienced its second collapse with a 
depreciation of over 20 percent (40 percent in 1983-84), which further added to the 
economic uncertainty, as seen in the figure below. 69  
 
Table 2: Exchange Rate and Depreciation 1980 to 2000 
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After much of the turmoil of the early 1990s was dealt with, aggressive reform from the 
Fidel Ramos Administration in 1994 ushered in a notable growth period in the Philippine 
economy, peaking in the middle of the decade at nearly a 6.0 percent GDP growth rate.70  
This growth period was needed and was a major influencing factor in allowing the 
Philippines to weather the ensuing Asian Financial Crisis. 
The Asian Financial Crisis took place in July 1997 and was marked by declining 
currencies starting from Thailand and spreading throughout most of Southeast Asia.  
Particularly in the Philippines, the peso was overvalued which lead to a rush of 
investment into the real estate sector.  This, along with the Philippine corporate sector’s 
underperforming investments and over-borrowing lead to a very vulnerable economic 
situation.71  During this time was the third collapse of the peso, depreciating at over 52 
percent.72  
There were positives that came from the crisis.  Most prominently, it was not the 
governments’ wrongdoing that caused the crisis.  Rather, it was due to external factors 
outside of the control of the government; namely, the currency crisis and an untimely 
drought.  Another positive was that this was the first time, since Philippine independence, 
that peso devaluation didn’t lead to an economic crisis.73  Another explanation for the 
recovery was that the Philippines was not as involved as its neighbors in seeing the 
foreign investment in the years leading up to the big economic pull out.  According to 
Balisacan and Hill, “The country was effectively excluded from international capital 
markets until 1992,” and, “Even when the capital account was opened, foreign investors 
who had lost out in the 1980s approached the country with caution.”74  Because of this, 
the capital inflow was minimal which made for the pull out less as destructive as its 
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neighbors.  The lack of economic performance in the 1970s discouraged potential 
investors which shielded the Philippines from the hazards of large liquid investments.  
Thought this was immediately causing less foreign investment within the country, it 
proved to be an insulating factor during the Asian Financial Crisis.  
This is a contributing factor to the relative stability and speed of the economic 
recovery.75  During the conclusion of this period, political turmoil (along with the fourth 
collapse of the peso) once again affected the Philippines, culminating in People Power 
Power II which ousted the Joseph Estrada Administration and ushered in the Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo term.   
 
Politics 
As previously mentioned, the Philippine political system is very much similar to 
the US political system.  The development of the executive branch and the powers 
afforded to the president are unique features to Philippine politics.  The tendencies and 
behaviors by the Philippine government can been characterized as centralism.76  
Centralism is when decision making powers are lessened in the local and provincial level 
and centralized on the national level.  For the Philippines, the decision-making of the 
country is concentrated in Manila and is responsible for the oversight of every significant 
(and often insignificant) national decision.  Centralism, in the Philippine context, has lead 
to a political history of corruption and manipulation of legal decision making and control.  
Corruption developed in the Philippines has been traced back to the legacies of the 
Spanish colonial history as well as imprudent, insufficient, and disparate salaries afforded 
to government workers in the decades following independence.  According to Wurfel, “In 
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the process of narrowing the salary gap between top and low-level civil servants, the 
economic pressures that result as those on top try to maintain their same relative social 
position, work against honest administration.”77 Moreover, much political attention 
historically has been placed on the image of administrative responsiveness; often times 
seeing presidential intervention in the “predilection of the masses.”  Wurfel points to the 
paradoxical nature of this tendency stating that, “(The president) sometimes denied 
himself the hours necessary for wise decisions on top policy questions which could have 
had an even greater long-term beneficial effect on mass welfare.” 78  This has led to 
points in history where presidential effectiveness, and subsequently governmental 
effectiveness, has been hampered by political tradition and norm.   
Philippine politics has, at times, sped up or made worse economic crises; while 
other times it has unknowingly acted as a buffer.  One such example of this was the 
relatively low impact of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis.  Many of its Asian neighbors 
were affected by this major financial crisis while the Philippine economy was relatively 
unshaken.  The effects of this event were dampened by other factors that were taking 
place in the Philippines.  The crisis was sparked by a large and sudden financial pullout 
of liquid portfolio investments in Asia, mainly from European investors.  This all started 
from the appreciation of the Japanese Yen in 1984 which lead to large European 
investment throughout the region.  The Philippines was a relative non-player in this 
process and was excluded from the economic boom known as the “Golden Years” of 
Asian development. 79  In the 1980s, the Philippine’s average GDP growth was a 
shockingly low 1.0 percent compared to 7.6 percent growth for Thailand and 6.1 percent 
for Indonesia. 80 This underperformance was largely in part due to the political conditions 
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that were present in the Philippines during this era of European investment.  The years 
leading up to the 1986 People Power Movement I, which ousted the Ferdinand Marcos 
regime, were filled with political and social uncertainty.  Political assassinations, violence 
and kidnappings of Marcos political rivals, and overall political and economic corruption 
created an environment that was less than welcoming to foreign direct investment.  
Subsequently, when the same investments were abruptly pulled from Asia in 1997, the 
Philippines was relatively unscathed.  Regardless of whether the relative economic 
stability the Philippines experienced during and after the Asian Financial Crisis was due 
to prudent economic policy or its being left out of foreign direct investment because of 
larger political and economic undesirability, the end result was a slow moving, 
moderately insulted Philippine economy.   
 Political development in the Philippines has disrupted the economic environment 
making the Philippine market unattractive to potential investors.  The uncertainties of 
multiple coup attempts, people power movements, and the impact of changing 
presidential regimes have stood in the way of creating a lasting economic environment 
conducive to successful development and has hampered the government’s ability to 
properly address Philippine Muslim unrest.   
 
Economic and Political Development in the ARMM 
Numerous economic plans aimed at encouraging economic development in the 
ARMM failed for a magnitude of reasons.  Failed attempts to develop the Mindanao 
region and to integrate the Muslim community into the larger Philippine political and 
economic state were squandered because of a multitude of reasons; ranging from poor 
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planning, mismanagement, and lack of funds to corruption, nepotism, theft, and 
ineptitude.   
The political development of the Philippines greatly depended on the 
effectiveness of the Philippine government.  The fact that Philippine government was 
fraught with inadequacies put the Philippine Muslims at a disadvantage right from the 
onset.  Abinales refers to it as “riddled with bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, 
dependent on the United States, dominated by oligarchic forces that exploited state 
resources for patrimonial ends, and faced by repeat outbursts from below.”81   
A turning point for the Philippine government was the 1946 seven year Huk 
rebellion in Northern Luzon.  This was the first incidence where expanding capitalism 
and peasant right’s clashed.  Huk comes from the term Hukbalahap, a Tagalog acronym 
for People’s Anti-Japanese Army, and took place immediately after end of Japanese 
occupation. The uprising was caused by the villagers’ discontent with the capitalist 
practices that were being employed by wealthy landowners and backed by the 
government.  Many of the Hukbalahap fought the Japanese occupation and after the US 
took control of the country, these freedom fighters were being arrested, killed, and 
harassed by police and were being regarded as communist subversives.  Landlord 
organizations were encouraging the arrest of the Hukbalahap because of fears of potential 
organized and guerilla-hardened uprisings.  During the war, many landlords (some 
Japanese sympathizers) sought shelter in Manila and upon their coming back to the 
provinces they demanded back taxes to be paid by their tenants.  During this time, 
landlords also want to implement changes in farming practices and were fearful of the 
war-hardened Hukbalahap.82  The Huk rebellion revealed the importance of rural 
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economic development and influenced the Philippine government to seek out rural 
development plans.  
With development in mind, and wanting to tap into resources of Mindanao, the 
Philippine government commissioned ambitious relocation plans to populate and develop 
the region.  The period from 1946 to 1972 saw five major government initiatives to 
relocate population to Mindanao. 83  All of these initiatives were failures.  Corruption, 
mismanaged funds, incompetent management, and what Abinales calls “gangsterism and 
political parasitism” rendered these projects useless. 84  Organization such as the Land 
Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) and the Mindanao Development 
Authority (MDA), failed to follow through on any of the development promises to the 
Mindanao people.  Again, the Muslim community lost out on the benefits of the planned 
development initiatives because of the corruption and mismanagement by a structurally 
unsound Philippine government.  
 This spurred on further problems in the south.  Abinales states, “Rising land 
values and shrinking mean farm size made capital formation by tenants and squatters 
difficult,” continuing, “more and more, available land was bought by nonresidents and 
wealthy pioneers with large landholdings.”85  This trend created class stratification and 
increased marginalization of the non-landowning laboring class.  According to Abinales, 
“Instead of helping to solve the country’s major source of social unrest, migration to 
Mindanao had spread it,” continuing, “migration eventually created a politically fragile 
context in which communal conflicts as well as class tensions were now imminent.” 86  
The development plan of encouraging migration to the rural Mindanao backfired and 
created a society with an untenable disparity in resource ownership.   
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 When the transfer from Spanish to US rule occurred, the Philippines was not a 
unified entity; rather it was a fragmented dynamic society or levels of societies.  During 
the first decade of US rule, this ethnic fragmentation was seen by the existence of two 
military organizations operated by autonomous army administrations in the Mountain 
Province and the Moro Province.87  These military entities were formed on the 
assumption that non-Christian tribes were distinctly different than the Christian majority.  
Immediately the culture of inequality and isolation was reinforced.  Abinales states, “The 
Americans knew that, historically, they had never been integrated into the Philippines, 
and until their transformation into ‘civilized subjects’ was achieved, they were to be 
secluded and protected from the ‘more civilized’ Filipinos,” continuing, “In these 
provinces, the army-run regimes exercised authoritarian control, limiting indigenous 
participation in local administrative affairs.”88  The establishment of American rule 
combined with the attitude that the provincial Filipinos were “uncivilized,” provided the 
basis for the isolation of the rural, Muslim Filipinos in the southern islands.  Immediately 
there was a distinction made between the “more civilized” Filipinos and the “uncivilized” 
majority. 
 The first few presidential administrations tried to expand Moro participation 
integrating datus, or Muslim tribal chieftain, into national, municipal, and provincial 
politics.  This was the beginning of the political evolution of the Philippine Muslims 
within the framework of the Philippine state.  Years of evolution and warring put the 
Muslims on the path to the political representation afforded to their Christian 
counterparts.  This was the situation leading up to the escalating violence and the 
separatist movement in the 1970s.   
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 Before the declaration of martial law in 1972, rebellions by the MNLF and the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the waning influence of strong men and 
disparate land ownership in Mindanao highlighted and strained the already weak 
Philippine government.  Martial law suspended all elections and democratic processes of 
the country.  Abinales states, “The scholarly consensus on the modern state in the 
Philippines assumes that despite variations in state form – colonial and postcolonial, 
American and Filipino, cacique democratic and authoritarian – one single process of state 
formation transpired over a territory unproblematically understood as ‘the 
Philippines’.”89  Of course this was not the case.   
 The fragmented nature of Philippine politics and the rising disparate nature of 
wealth in the south, brought upon by poor migration policy, spurred escalating violence 
and unrest in the Muslim region.  This was the reason for the creation of the MNLF in 
1969.  The MNLF was the main organization representing the Philippine Muslims and 
their desire to create a separate autonomous Bangsamoro Republik.  This desire to create 
a separate nation-state was in response to being left out of the economic and political 
process of the Philippine state.  
 The escalating violence continued and starting from the 1996 peace agreement 
between the Philippine government and the MNLF (which the MILF did not agree with), 
the two parties were engaged in peace negotiations to try to find a resolution to the 
hostilities, though these were mostly informal in nature.  This peace agreement was 
broken, and then a new ceasefire agreement emerged in July 1997.  The Philippine 
government and the MILF opened up formal talks at the Da’wah Center, in October of 
1999, in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.90 The years leading to these formal negotiations 
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were marked with broken ceasefire agreements and spats of violence (ever-increasing in 
nature during this period).  Only a months after the formal talks opened, the most intense 
fighting between the two parties erupted and then-President Joseph Estrada declared an 
“all-out-war” campaign against the MILF.  The fragile cycle of peace negotiations and 
violence that lead up to one of the most deadly government campaigns showed the 
tenuous nature of the negotiating relationship.  
 Within six months, all major MILF camps were captured and the MILF was all 
but defeated.  During this time, the two head negotiators continued to meet attempting to 
find a peaceful solution; none was found.  Though warring seemed to be finished, in the 
week that followed the capture of Camp Abubakar there were guerilla type attacks by the 
MILF in a public market in a small farming village that killed twenty-one and attacks 
against government forces throughout Mindanao.  It was clear that the MILF was not 
completely destroyed.  Instead, they were able to avoid most of the clashes with the 
superior Philippine government forces and firmly entrenched themselves for the 
prolonged guerilla style war seen today.    
 Despite the continued warring after 1996, the 1996 peace agreement signed 
between the two parties finalized the plan that was outlined in the Tripoli Agreement and 
solidified the political foundation for the fourteen provinces and nine cities within the 
ARMM.  To placate and integrate the MNLF into the new system, top members were 
given positions within two new governmental arms the Consultive Assembly and the 
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD).91  Misuari was made 
SPCPD chairman and was the eventual governor of the ARMM.  Much of the ex-
guerillas and military men of the MNLF were integrated into the Philippine armed forces.     
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 From the creation of the ARMM; the MNLF and Misuari, who acted as the 
representative of the Muslim community, disagreed with the way that the region was 
fashioned.  The MILF became a major player because of this disagreement and because 
of its accumulation of military might.  Struggles both on the battle field and at the 
negotiating table ensued for decades and is the basis of what is seen today. 
 Today, the ARMM is the one of the worst performing economic regions of the 
country.  In 2007, the ARMM had the second lowest Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP) of all 17 regions at 5.4 percent, compared to 7.8 percent growth in the National 
Capital Region (NCR), or the Manila area, and 9.4 percent growth for the MIMAROPA 
region.92  The ARMM also lagged behind in percent of expenditures in the country.  The 
figure below shows the Gross Regional Domestic Expenditures (GRDE), the total sum of 
all final uses of goods and services in the Philippines – which totaled almost 1.4 billion 
pesos in 2007.  The island of Luzon (including NCR) accounts for over 65 percent of all 
expenditure in the country; while Mindanao only accounting for 17.7 percent, as seen in 
the figure below. 93 
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Table 3: Gross Regional Domestic Expenditure Distribution by Island Groups 2007 
 
 
The ARMM per capita GRDP growth has been the lowest in the country from in 2005 to 
2007.  As seen in the chart below the NCR region is consistently the most wealthy and 
economically producing region in the country.  It is also the seat of the political and 
economic power in the country.  One of the issues of wealth and resource distribution 
between the NCR and the ARMM is the presence of multinational agribusinesses such as 
Delmonte and Dole.  These corporations, starting in the 1980s, established large farming 
operations in Mindanao pushing many of the traditional farmers off the land that they 
once previously owned.  Many of these companies rehired the same farmers to till the 
corporate land.  The government distribution of resources is based on taxes collected in 
each province and municipality and though these large agribusinesses are located in 
Mindanao, many of their corporate headquarters are located in the NCR.  Therefore, the 
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taxes paid by these large corporations are coming from the NCR rather than the ARMM, 
and thus, the resource distribution stemming from taxes is unbalanced.   
 Decades of underdevelopment has also led the ARMM to see some of the highest 
poverty incidence rates in the country.  The chart below shows the poverty incidence in 
2000 and 2003.  There is a noticeable difference in poverty incidence between the region 
with the political seat of government and the isolated ARMM. 
 
Table 4: Regional Poverty Incidence 2000 & 2003 
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Figure 3: Poverty Incidence Maps 2005 
 
50 
 Seen in the charts above, the ARMM is had the highest rate of provincial and 
municipal poverty of the country in 2005.  The effects of decades of failed economic 
policy and development programs in the ARMM have lead to this great wealth disparity 
and an overall feeling of isolation and under-representation amongst the Philippine 
Muslim community. 
Politically, since the People Power Movement II in 2001, there were many events 
that affected the entire Philippine Muslim community.  2002 saw the international 
emergence of JI with the bombing a nightclub in Bali killing two hundred civilians.  
Allegations arose tying JI to the MILF which were rebuked by the MILF leadership.  
Later that year, signed a truce with the Philippine government; again, this proved to be 
only temporary.  In October of 2004, a sixty person International Monitoring Team 
(IMT) arrived in the Philippines to oversee the ceasefire between the parties.  Consisting 
of members from Malaysia and Brunei, the group was set with the task of advising and 
helping reinforce the tenuous peace agreement.94  The IMT mandate ended this year and 
the Malaysian government announced its withdrawal from the project.  In 2007, the Ad 
Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) was formed as a way for the Philippine government 
and the MILF to cooperate in sharing informational on terrorist activities in hopes of 
limiting unintentional clashes between the two groups.  A similar contract between the 
MNLF and the Philippine government has yet to been formed.   
 The conflict has continued with spats of violence keeping both parties on edge.  In 
August 2007, clashes between military and Moro guerillas left 83 people dead.95  Within 
the ten months prior, there were 10 Marines and seven Christian government construction 
workers that were abducted and beheaded by the ASG.  As recently as early February 
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2008, skirmishes between the Philippine police and MILF have been recorded.96  
Philippine Muslim leaders have tried to bring their plight to the international stage, 
seeking OIC backing; however, there has been little international intervention and 
attention brought upon this situation.    
 The economic and political development of the Philippines and of the ARMM has 
been fraught with turmoil and fluctuation.  The combination a weak government 
stemming from its initial reliance and dependence on US trade agreements and 
unchallenged access to its markets, has made Philippine development was erratic and 
unsustainable.  The weak government inherited by the Spanish colonial period was 
further strained by extreme division due of the dynamic nature of the Philippine culture.  
Establishing a political system on a fractioned and divided culture has been the major 
challenge that has faced the country.   
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CHAPTER 4: OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
 
 This research explores how the economic and political conditions of the 
Philippines have directly impacted Philippine Muslim unrest.  Other contributing factors 
such as the socio-cultural setting, geographic setting, historical evolution, and quality of 
life which need to be taken under consideration are examined here. 
 
Socio-Cultural Setting 
 Philippine socio-cultural setting has had a major impact on the country’s 
economic and political development since its independence.  Its cultural values are unlike 
any other country found in the region and create a unique cultural mindset and value 
system that pervades every aspect of Philippine society, including the Muslim 
community.  Additionally, an analysis of Philippine culture would be incomplete if its 
colonial past and development since were not considered in the context of modern day 
customs, values, and tendencies.  How to bridge that divide between disparate, yet very 
similar, cultures will lead to the lasting peace that the Filipino people desire. 
 
Influence of Islam 
 Religious affiliations are much more than a belief system; they are often 
interwoven into the fabric of individuals' and communities' lives.  For instance, Islamic 
law, or Sharia, encompasses nearly all aspects of human life ranging from private and 
public to civil and criminal.  The Sharia is separated into two categories: worship and 
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social relations, and has laws on almsgiving, fasting, prayer, commercial activities, 
property, divorce, marriage, personal conduct, and hygiene.  However, Christian law 
lends itself to a more secular nature because of its lack of scripture focusing directly with 
political and governing details.  The Philippine legal system does not directly 
acknowledge the Sharia.   
 Tribal influence still has its effects on the Muslim culture.97  Patrimonial family 
structures have an emphasis on lineage through males and plays an important role in 
creating stability, and establishing social class, and social standing within the community.  
Tribal influence on family structure also plays a major role in defining the population.  
Extended family, kinship, and village ties are often the principal sources of identity and 
social standing.   Using Mohammad as a model, family relationships developed through 
marriage were of utmost importance in establishing and maintaining family survival.  
Marriage outside of religion is rare and family is extremely important in providing 
security and support (in exchange for loyalty). 98  In order to be successful, an individual 
must have the full support of the family and its resources.  Family structure provided for 
security, prestige, welfare, and political prominence.  Since Philippine independence and 
the beginning of modest economic growth, the family institution was weakened.  
However, it still retains its importance.   
 The Islamic tradition also carries a deep and lasting memory of the past and their 
followers’ awareness of history is much more prominent than that of the Christian 
tradition.99 There are many shared cultural values of the Christian and Muslim Philippine 
communities; one of the most obvious being the hierarchical/patrimonial structure of 
society.  
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Hierarchical/Patrimonial Social Structure 
 There are three major cultural aspects that govern Philippine traditional social 
structure and impact every aspect of Philippine life.  The first aspect is the “orientation of 
the individual toward his family and perhaps toward a small group of allies who are 
bound to him (the one in power) by personal ties.”100  This can be seen through the 
rampant corruption, favoritism, and nepotism that plague much of the culture.  Eric Budd, 
in Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States, explains that “Filipino 
economic and political elites are bound together by familial ties,” continuing, “Politics 
has been both a source of economic wealth, and a means of protecting wealth already 
acquired.”  He goes on by stating, “Utilizing their political connections, the economic 
elites plunder the state, launching their predatory attacks with impunity.”101 The second 
aspect is, when addressing members outside of one’s own group, the propensity to use 
power as an issue-resolving mechanism.  This tendency often promotes the development 
of patron-client relationships with those with less power aligning and seeking alliances 
with more influential individuals in society.102  The third aspect of Philippine culture is 
“the structuring of society on vertical and hierarchical lines,” giving individuals an acute 
consciousness for class standing and hierarchical social systems.103  This creates an 
environment where the poor and social outcast are left out of political and social ordering 
and decision-making on the largest level.  Subsequently, there are large and ever-
increasing numbers of poor and economically disadvantaged in the Philippines. 
The first aspect of Philippine culture can be traced back to Spanish colonial 
political and social structuring.  The Spaniards had a tradition of centralized 
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administration wherein the governor general was appointed control of the country and 
could decide whether or not he would listen to his council, known as the Audiencia.  The 
governor general was not bound by any institutional mechanism that could conduct 
checks and balances of his power; thus giving the governor general complete and 
exclusive rights to running the government as he saw fit.104  Much like the barangays of 
today, Philippine culture emphasizes patrimonial, familial type relationships where a lone 
individual or groups of individuals are able to be the sole, relatively unquestioned, 
decision maker(s).  Loyalties to family, groups of allies, and individuals with personal 
ties to the decision makers often receive preference in this type of system.  A patrimonial 
structuring of the Philippine political system can be seen today, John J. Caroll et al. in 
Philippine Institutions state, “Governmental power resides mainly in the national 
government, and most specifically in the person and office of the president.”105  This type 
of structuring impedes economic growth.  Budd states, “(In patrimonial states) policies 
end up promoting particularistic interests, rather than the national interest,” and “political 
struggles end up largely being over access to a piece of the pie.”106  The personification 
of the Philippine government by the President can be traced to pre-Spanish tradition and 
society.  In this environment the datu, or the leader of the community, was the supreme 
ruler and “father of his people” and believed to take on mythical and magic powers.  He 
was the sole arbitrator of both private and public disputes.  The influence of this is even 
seen in the Philippine Constitution stating that the President swears to, “Do justice to 
every man and consecrate myself to the service of the nation.”107 
The second aspect of Philippine culture lends itself to the patron-client system, 
which is seen throughout Philippine culture and history and bounded by a Philippine 
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tradition referred to as utang na loόb.108  Utang na loόb, or personal debt from either a 
prime obligation or in reciprocation from previous favors, is so engrained in the 
Philippine psyche that much of the social and political events and structuring have been 
built around this tradition.  This also has lead to the patron-client system in the 
Philippines.  According to Caroll et al., “The patron-leader-client triad is the basic 
building block of the Philippine political structure in the barrios (barangays) and 
towns.”109  The patron-client system, also known as rent seeking or clientelism, has its 
roots in family structures and was developed as a way to maintain order and security in 
unpredictable environments; this social structure stemming from particular family 
ordering is also seen throughout the Middle East where a tribal-based society was 
formed.  A patron-client relationship is based on clients seeking rewards, protection, or 
security from the patron in exchange for the client’s loyalty (political, economic, or 
social).  In this situation, national leaders (patrons) provide for the provincial leaders 
(clients) in exchange for their electoral support during election periods.  This relationship 
structure continues to the lower levels of governance – provincial leaders to municipal 
leaders, municipal leaders to local leadership, etc.110  Patron-client societies discourage 
entrepreneurship and stand in the way of economic development.111  Confronting 
members outside of one’s group in a forceful manner is also how the Philippine 
government has been addressing the Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao for the 
last few decades, with no lasting sustainable success.112   
The third factor speaks to the underlying class hierarchical system that remained 
from the Spanish colonial period.  An acceptance of, often God-given, social class has 
lead to a society that in many ways is more tolerant to disparate wealth distribution and 
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large power gaps in political access.  This ingrained aspect of culture could also 
contribute to the observation that when social discontent in the Philippines does manifest 
itself its often in an exaggerated manner; as seen in the actions of the Philippine people 
and military in the two People Power Movements of 1986 and 2001. 
Four concepts that reinforce these three highlighted cultural elements are utang na 
loόb, hiya, pakikisama, and amor propio.113  Utang na loόb, again, are debts of 
obligation; hiya is the term of for shame and is seen when an offer of allegiance or aid is 
refused; pakikisama means, “to group with” and expresses the concept of getting along 
together and leads to the often amiable disposition of Filipinos; and amor propio is the 
concept of personal dignity and the respect of others.  Saving face and social respect are 
significant features of Asian and Filipino culture.  These factors all underlie the 
tendencies of nepotism, fragmented dependency of cooperation, and the 
disenfranchisement of “out-of-power” groups.  As such, the Philippines has been plagued 
with clan, tribal, and ethnic feuding.  Kessler believes that the Philippine culture plays a 
major role here.  He states, “The (Philippine) culture tends to isolate groups; rather than 
bridging social gulfs it increases social distance, with cooperation among individuals 
intensifying rather than reducing conflict between individual alliances.”114  
These three factors structure how Philippine society operates. When taken into a 
whole, these influence Philippine culture to favor informal institutional structures rather 
than formal structures.  In such a culture, individuals and “in-groups” have the ability to 
supersede formalities and legal barriers.  David Wurfel in Governments and Politics of 
Southeast Asia, states, “In no aspect of Philippine government is the gulf between theory 
and practice, between formal arrangements and informal practices, more obvious than in 
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public personnel administration…some of the discrepancies are a result of manipulation 
of the rules; others flow from a complete disregard of them.”115  These socio-cultural 
factors are at direct odds with the governmental and economic formal institutions adopted 
during independence. Socio-cultural elements have acted as major hindrances to 
Philippine development.  Corruption, favoritism, and nepotism and the patrimonial 
ordering of society have created unwelcoming economic environments for potential 
foreign investors and have acted as a roadblock to sustainable, equitable growth.   
Another institution greatly affected by these three factors is the Philippine 
military, or AFP.  In sharp contrast to developed countries’ military forces, many times 
throughout Philippine history this arm of government has acted as a protectorate of those 
wealthy and politically influential rather than the ordinary Filipino that does not share in 
the riches of the elite.  According to Richard Kessler, “The government has traditionally 
employed the AFP to protect elite interests, not to ensure the national defense…it has 
functioned as the primary tool to frustrate social reform.”116  As seen in the two major 
political events of the Philippines (People Power Movements I and II), a small band of 
military was able to mobilize the greater society to transfer power from one group to 
another.  These cultural factors played a huge role in events that transpired in February of 
1986, when a few hundred men from the military were able to turn the entire military 
against Marcos.  As it was later revealed, personal friendships and connections of 
military commanders to ex-military commanders that joined the Reform the AFP 
Movement (RAM), played a major role in turning the tide on Marcos’ despotic rule.  
Kessler states, “It also illustrates the weak command structure in the Philippine military, 
the importance of secret cliques and personal loyalties that overlap and supersede the 
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military chain of command,” continuing that, “In moments of crisis – indeed, in the 
moments in which most military men instinctively obey superior authority – the informal 
command structure controls behavior.”117 This phenomenon is not exclusively isolated to 
just the AFP, but is also seen throughout the Philippine Muslim Separatist movement 
with the splitting of the MNLF and the creation of the MILF.  
Philippine culture is based on family ties, power-based approaches to conflict, and 
a hierarchical class system and affects every aspect of Philippine social, political, 
economic, and military development.  It creates a patrimonial state based on patron-client 
relationships.  Eric Budd states, “Filipino economic and political elites are bound together 
by familial ties,” continuing, “Politics has been both a source of economic wealth, and a 
means of protecting wealth already acquired…utilizing their political connections, the 
economic elites plunder the state, launching their predatory attacks with impunity.”118  
The political situations over the last few decades have only added to the turmoil and 
uncertainty in the economic environment, making it an uninviting atmosphere for foreign 
direct investment and further impeding lasting Philippine peace.  The underperformance 
of the economy is reflected by the lagging social indicators of the Philippines.  Economic 
issues such as collapsing pesos and external currency crises have greatly impeded 
Philippine development and have created a government that’s weak in the resources 
needed to properly address Muslim unrest.  The influence of Islam in the Philippines as 
well as these three cultural features (the favoring of individuals towards their family and 
allies, the propensity toward the use of power as an issue-resolving mechanism, and the 
hierarchical social structuring) help to explain political and economic actions taken by 
members of Philippine leadership and the actions of the country’s military groups and the 
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context of the culture in which the it occurs.  It also helps put Philippine Muslim unrest 
into context.   
 
Geographic Setting 
The geographic setting of the Philippines and of the Muslim populated islands of 
Mindanao could act as a contributing factor to Philippine Muslim unrest.  The Philippines 
is located in Southeastern Asia in the southeastern edge of the Asian region.  The 
Philippines is the world’s second largest archipelago to Indonesia consisting of 7,107 
islands.  As a nation of 190,000 square miles, the Philippines lies directly south of 
Taiwan, northeast of Borneo, and north of the Indonesian islands of Moluccas and 
Sulawesi, while bordering it to the west is the South China Sea, to the east is the 
Philippine Sea, and to the south is the Celebes Sea.  With almost 92 million people, the 
Philippines is the 12th most populated country in the world and shares no land boundaries 
with any other country, providing roughly 23,000 miles of coastline.119  The Philippines 
is primarily composed of mountains with coastal lowlands which vary in size.  About 
6,620 islands are smaller than one square mile and eleven islands account for over 90 
percent of the population and 95 percent of the land area.120   
The Philippines is made up of so many islands that it could have lead to 
difficulties in building infrastructure and creating social cohesion.  Certainly, having to 
integrate and develop over 7,000 islands is no small task and this undertaking has created 
unique economic and political conditions.  However, this factor alone cannot explain the 
lack of economic success that the Philippines has experienced.  Indonesia, which consists 
of over 17,500 islands, averaged an annual GDP growth rate three times higher than that 
61 
of the Philippines from 1980 to 2000, with a growth rate of 7.6 percent and 4.2 percent in 
the 1980s and 90s while the Philippines had a 1 percent and 3.2 percent growth, 
respectively (seen on the chart on page 45).   
Japan is the third largest archipelago in the world with around 3,000 islands and is 
one of the most successful and economically stable countries in the entire Asian region.  
Moreover, compared to the location of its neighbors, for example Singapore, the fact that 
the Philippines is located in the southeastern corner of Asia could have made it a lot less 
attractive to open trade lines and commercial centers, accounting for passed over foreign 
investment, as seen in the map below.   
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Asia 
 
 Philippine Muslims have been primarily isolated to the southern islands of 
Mindanao.  Being considered almost a separate territory than much of the Philippines, 
Mindanao developed a different culture and way of life, including using law based on 
Sharia law.  In the 1970s, the Autonomous Region of Southern Philippines was formed; 
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while the ARMM, as seen today, was not formalized until 1989, and occupies the 
southwestern most part of Mindanao.  The physical distance from the seat of government 
and the economic hub Manila, Luzon has only added to the difficulty of political, 
economic, and social integration of the nation and adds an additional factor to the 
isolation of Philippine Muslims.  This is a contributing factor but not as strong as the 
economic and political conditions suffered by the country.  
 
Quality of Life 
 Quality of life is important to look at while considering issues of conflict.  The 
prolonged conflict between Philippine Muslims and non-Muslims has taken a great toll 
on the economic and social capital of the region.  Philippine Muslim reaction and the 
situation facing their community are directly impacted or driven by their access or limited 
access to political and economic national resources.  Internal division between the 
Catholic governing Philippine leaders and minority Muslims residents further divides 
these two communities.  Conflict has terrible internal and external effects; according to a 
World Bank World Development Report, “Wars cripple economies by destroying 
physical, human and social capital-reducing investment, diverting public spending from 
productive activities, and driving highly skilled workers to emigrate,” continuing, “In 
civil war a country’s per capita output falls an average of more than two percent a year 
relative to what it would have been without conflict.”121  Quality of life and poverty can 
exacerbate racial or social tensions within a country and act as an impetus for further 
conflict. 
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 One such example was in Rwanda in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.  Years of 
cash cropping strategies imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, along with poorly performing international markets, added to the already unstable 
economic conditions in Rwanda.  The strategy of developing cash crops as a competitive 
advantage puts a great amount of reliance on the whims of the volatile international 
market.  This leaves economies that employ this strategy vulnerable to an economic 
crisis.  In the years leading up to the 1994 genocide, the agricultural demand for 
Rwandan exports dropped and led to an unprecedented devaluation of the Rwandan 
Dollar.  During the genocide, over 100,000 people were killed in a little over three 
months.  There has not been a direct link to this sequence of events, but many political 
scientists speculate that the economic factors of global markets and inequality only 
strained the preexisting divisions in Rwanda. 
 Within the Philippines, quality of life has varied a great deal between urban life, 
mainly in metro-Manila, and rural life.  A 2003 estimate put 30 percent of the population 
under the poverty line compared to that of the US’s rate of 12 percent.122  A 2008 
estimate put the infant mortality rate in the Philippines almost four times higher than that 
of the US at over 21 deaths per 1,000 live births.123  Dramatic economic downturns, most 
notably in the years leading up to the 1986 overthrown of the Marcos regime, have 
widened the gap of wealth the country.  Promises of development and reform have been 
moderately successful, with the standard of living in the Philippines rising gradually over 
the last three decades.  In spite of this, the Philippines has been woefully outperformed by 
its Asian neighbors; neighbors that were once markedly well behind Philippine economic 
performance, as seen in the chart below. 
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Table 5: Regional Real GDP in 1950, 1975, 2000 
 
 
 In 1950, Philippine economic performance was on par with Japan and Singapore.  
Then in 1975, performance stagnated significantly compared Japan and Singapore; by 
2000, the Philippines was one of the most underperforming economies in the region.  
Vast wealth and resource gaps within the Philippines, along with poor development plans 
and an ineffective and weak government at a domestic level, combined with poor 
performance on an international level, greatly diminished the quality of life in the 
Philippines.  
 Today, the quality of life of the Philippines has improved.  Registered live births 
have increased from 1 million in 1970 to almost 1.75 million in 2002, while infant deaths 
have remained relatively constant at less than .5 million, in spite of a large population 
growth over the same time period.124 Many of the diseases that are treated today in the 
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country would have led to sure death just thirty years ago.  In spite of this, the country is 
still far behind the standards seen in developed states. 
 The quality of life of the Filipinos is important to this research.  As seen in 
Rwanda, economically polarized countries can lead to major conflict.  Huge wealth 
disparities can leave communities feeling disenfranchised and isolated.  The Philippines 
is a developing country with rampant poverty and slow economic growth due to a 
multitude of factors.  Out of this poverty, the Mindanao and the ARMM region is notably 
some of the most impoverished areas of the country.    
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 Addressing Philippine Muslim unrest is a major issue faced by the Philippine 
government and has been for decades.  As seen through this research, the separatist 
movement, stemming from the 1970s independence movement, is a significant policy and 
security issue for the country and the region.  Through taking a holistic approach, a 
clearer picture of the variables that most affect Muslim unrest in the Philippines were 
analyzed.  This section revisits the main themes explored throughout this research. 
 
Economic and Political Development 
The economic and political development of the Philippines has played a major 
role in prolonged Philippine Muslim unrest.  The up’s and down’s of Philippine 
economic growth have no doubt negatively effected the government’s ability to allot the 
proper resources needed to fully address the unrest.  Through the research above, even if 
the country’s poor economic performance is not taken into account, there is no guarantee 
that the Philippine government would have implemented tactics that could have lead to 
lasting peace and meaningful solutions.      
Multiple economic plans aimed at encouraging development in the ARMM failed 
for many different reasons.  Lethargic government attempts to develop Mindanao and to 
integrate the Muslim region into the larger Philippine political and economic community 
were squandered because of a multitude of reasons ranging from poor planning, 
mismanagement, lack of funding, corruption, nepotism, theft, and administrative 
ineptitude.   
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The Philippine economic conditions were quite favorable at the onset of 
independence and gradually became worse.  As seen above, the economic conditions of 
the country could not be separated from the political and international events that 
heightened or dampened the overall economic performance.  During this time, national 
allocation of prosperity was limited and was not distributed to the ARMM.  Political 
developments in the Philippines have significantly contributed to Muslim unrest by 
disrupting society and economic security and hindering the overall growth.  This made 
the Philippine market unattractive to potential investors and acted as a major barrier to 
economic and social growth.  The uncertainties of multiple coup attempts, people power 
movements, and the impact of changing presidential regimes hindered the creation of an 
economic environment conducive for successful development.  The Filipino Muslims 
were not integrated into the prosperity sharing of the state.    
 Wealth distribution was a major issue that lasted from Spanish times and through 
to the creation of the Philippine state.  The 1945 Huk rebellion, an uprising of rural 
farmers toward their wealthy landlords in Luzon, gave the Philippine government reason 
to see that wealth disparity can affect the overall stability of the country.  The uprising 
started when the landlords fled to urban areas during the fighting only to return to the 
villages after the war and forcefully demand the unpaid rent during the fighting.  After 
this, land settlement programs and development programs were established to take 
advantage of the untapped resources of the ARMM.  With the Philippine oligarchic 
system and a tradition of patron-client relationships deeply entrenched in the Filipino 
culture, many of these development efforts only lined the pockets of the wealthy and had 
very little effect on bridging the wealth gap.  The period of newly-granted independence 
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and the freeing of colonial oversight did not change the culture of the country.  During 
the transition from Japanese to American rule and then to independence the wealthy 
Filipinos worked in partnership with their occupiers.  Abinales states, “Filipino elites 
collaborated with the Japanese, and while guerrilla war in the countryside forced many to 
abandon their estates for the safer confines of the cities, they were not dispossessed of 
their wealth.”125  Elites partnering with the governing party in power is a common 
occurrence throughout Philippine history.  During the Marcos era, strained by economic 
underperformance, Kessler points out that, “social conflict surfaced among elites and 
between elites and other social strata, and the government’s ineffectiveness at 
suppressing rebellion spurred the conflict’s growth.”126  The role of the elites in Filipino 
history has played a role in the perpetuation of the Muslim conflict.   
The society of the Philippine Muslims was established on the weak, post-war 
political structure of the newly independent Republic of the Philippines.  Abinales 
describes this foundation as, “Riddled with bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, 
dependent on the United States, dominated by oligarchic forces that exploited state 
resources for patrimonial ends, and faced by repeat outbursts from below.”127  In this 
context, the oligarchic and weak nature of the Philippine government developed as a 
product of regressive Philippine-US trade agreements and rampant corruption.   
Despite this environment inherited by the newly independent Philippines and the 
ineffectual nature of the governing state, the Mindanao region never faced internal 
political destabilization.  The Mindanao political structure had a solid foundation and was 
insulated to much of the greater political turmoil that plagued the Philippines throughout 
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its history.  The concern over stability in the Mindanao region was the result of class 
differences between Muslim farmers and wealthy resource owners.128   
Contrary to my initial speculation and thesis, the economic and political 
development in the Philippines is not the sole major cause for Muslim unrest.  The 
economic and political development of the Philippines is not strong enough to be the sole 
reasons for Muslim unrest; they contribute but are not the lone cause.   
 
Historical Evolution 
 Kessler states, “The reason primus inter pares for rebellion in the Philippines is 
the historical Filipino search for a national identity.”129  National revolutionary hero and 
the Philippine’s first president Emilio Aguinaldo, once said, “Let us leave behind all 
these parties and other things that cripple our unity, and let us all be one name – Filipinos 
– a sign that we are one nation, one loόb (spirit), one Katipunan (group).”130 The 
historical evolution of the Philippines is unlike any other in Asia and cannot be dismissed 
when looking at the roots of Philippine Muslim unrest.  Most all of Asia has Chinese and 
Indian influence and though the Philippines was influenced by those cultures it has 
comparatively less than most countries in the region.  Instead, Philippine historical 
evolution is marked by colonization by western rulers.  The Philippines was a Spanish 
colony for over three hundred years ranging from 1565 to 1898.  In 1898, Philippines 
gained independence from the Spanish after the Spanish-American War and came under 
the rule of the US.  In 1935, the Philippines became a Commonwealth of the United 
States.  During World War II, the Philippines was ruled by the Japanese for four years 
starting in 1942.  The Philippines because an independent state in 1946.   
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 The recent history of the Philippines has been marred with political turmoil, 
military coup attempts, economic underperformance, and terror attacks.  The major 
events in Philippine modern history are the People Power Movements I and II of 1986 
and 2001, also known as The EDSA Revolution One and Two.  People Power Movement 
I was a complete overthrow of the despotic Ferdinand Marcos Administration by millions 
of Filipinos that revolted on EDSA Blvd – the main thoroughfare through metro Manila 
in February of 1986.  This revolt against the Marcos regime was sparked by a few 
hundred military men and anti-Marcos military officers. People Power Movement II took 
place in January of 2001, and overthrew then-President Joseph “Erap” Estrada.  The Erap 
Administration was marked with nepotism, corruption, and broken promises and just like 
the People Power Movement I, the people of Manila, along with a small band of military 
men and officers, protested in the streets and made a political statement.  These two 
movements in many ways illustrate the resilience and fighting spirit of which the Filipino 
people pride themselves on.  Even during centuries of Spanish rule, the Philippine people 
always saw themselves as independent from their Spanish rulers.   
 Philippine Muslim history varies greatly from much of the other Filipinos because 
they were able to forcefully rejected Spanish rule.  Over the span of the Spanish colonial 
period there were a total of six wars, known as the Moro Wars, between the Philippine 
Muslims and the Spanish.  The Philippine Islamic culture was untouched and 
unconquered during the colonial periods.  In 1990, in spite of calls for full national 
sovereignty by the MNLF, the Filipino government created the ARMM in the south 
western part of Mindanao granting local autonomy within the Philippine state structure.   
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 Philippine historical evolution is unique to many Asian countries and has played a 
significant role in the development of the Philippine Muslim community.  A long history 
of feuding between the colonial rulers and the Philippine Muslims set the stage for the 
independent spirit of the Philippine Muslims.  Though the historical evolution explains 
where Philippine Muslim unrest originated, it does not explain the continuation of the 
conflict.  From analyzing the history of the country, cultural tendencies and norms began 
to emerge.  Culture is much more pervasive and influential than either the economic and 
political development or the historical evolution.  
 
Socio-Cultural Setting 
 The socio-cultural setting in the Philippines has stood in the way of lasting 
economic and political development.  These deeply ingrained tendencies have played a 
major role in the perpetuation of Philippine Muslim unrest.  The historical evolution, 
mentioned above, has shaped the social-cultural setting.  The socio-cultural setting of the 
Philippines is the most pervasive and influential variable examined throughout this 
research.   
 
Hierarchical/Patrimonial Social Structure 
 Patricio N. Abinales in Making Mindanao states, “Scholars have argued that the 
Japanese occupation and the subsequent return of the United States did very little to alter 
the class hierarchy and power structure of the Philippines,”131  Three main unique 
cultural aspects of Philippine culture are the orientation to favor a small group of allies 
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bound by personal ties, the propensity to use force when addressing members outside of 
one’s own group, and structuring society in a stratified hierarchical manner.132  These 
factors significantly contribute to the rampant favoritism, corruption, and nepotism that 
have dogged the Philippines since its independence in 1946.  Kessler states, “Philippine 
behavior is popularly seen as being based on an intricate value system emphasizing 
reciprocity among individuals and the smooth functioning of personal relations,” and 
that, “the kinship circle that facilitated the expansion of cults is based on blood ties and 
ritual kin relations.”133  This provides for patron-client power relationships to develop, 
both internally at a governmental level and a local level and internationally.   
 Patron-client relationships can be seen in the power struggle in the country.  
Kerkvliet describes the development of the patron-client relationship as, “poor people, 
knowing that they will often find themselves in need of assistance from people who are 
better off, try to strengthen their ties to patrons and wealthy kin.”134  The attaching to 
more powerful individuals is a way to gain access to resources, protection, and to raise 
their overall quality of life.  Elites are able to distribute their resources downward to allies 
in order to ensure their allegiance and their support.  Kessler states that, “Elites (have) 
become skilled at distributing benefits rather than at promoting social change because 
change alters the balance of power in society.”135  Because of this culture, politics, and 
economics are all entangled.  In the Philippines, individuals who may have less influence 
and power align themselves and seek alliances with more influential individuals in 
society.136   
 The common practice of using power to handle disputes on a national level and on 
a local level creates an environment of in and out groups in which the allocation of 
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resources and power are unequal.137  The in and out groups have vastly different 
advantages and opportunities for political and economic expression.  In the Philippines, 
the poor and socially outcast are left out of political and social spheres and decision-
making on the largest level.  Subsequently, there are vast numbers of economically 
insecure and politically underrepresented throughout the country.   
 Two examples of economic and political plans aimed at development of 
Mindanao that have failed because of socio-cultural intervention are the 1950 Land 
Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) and the 1951 formation of the 
MDA.  In attempt to fully utilize all the resources in the country there were five major 
government initiatives to colonize the Mindanao region from 1964 to 1972.  LASEDECO 
was in charge of much of this transition of settlers and pioneers from the northern parts of 
the country to Mindanao.  All of these attempts had very little success, if any.  The 
institutional bodies that were to carry out these ambitious plans in the name of overall 
Philippines economic growth failed the Philippine people and created an environment 
that would turn out to be explosive.  Abinales states, “The principle reasons (for the 
failure) were administrative ineptitude, pervasive corruption, and lackluster support from 
weak state authorities.”138  A weak government could not provide the necessary oversight 
needed to create the formal structures, free from corruption and ineptitude that was 
needed to carry out these economic plans.  LASEDECO’s predecessor the National Land 
Settlement Administration (NLSA) was fraught with gangsterism, incompetent 
management, and corruption and thought LASEDECO was to be a reformed version of 
its unsuccessful predecessor it was still plagued by gross inadequacies.  According to a 
Memorandum to the Department of State, LASEDECO suffered from “inefficiency, 
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mismanagement, red tape and venality of government officials who are supposed to do 
everything within their power to encourage and assist homesteaders.”139  LASEDECO 
disintegrated because of theft, corruption, mismanagement, and insurmountable debts 
inherited from the NLSA.  LASEDECO was said to have lost up to twelve million pesos 
to corruption and over 22 million pesos into debt, which was said to be mainly embezzled 
or squandered.140  In this example, imprudent economic policy and initiative was not the 
only factor at play.  A weak government, lack of financial oversight, and corruption 
played a major role in the organization’s demise and ended up only wasting Philippine 
resources and widening the income gap.   
 Another attempt by the Philippine government to take advantage of the resources 
of Mindanao saw the creation of the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA).  This 
corporate organization with governmental power was to contribute to the overall national 
wealth by controlling development of the Mindanao region.  It was granted powers to 
oversee growth in the economic, social, educational, and health sectors as well as 
responsible for infrastructural development.  It was given an initial budget of 21 million 
pesos.141  Though formed in 1951, it took over a decade before it became operational and 
was more of a farce than a genuine development initiative.  It was supported by 
politicians but it was never fully functional.  The MDA never had an office or board of 
directors and soon became more of a farce than a development mechanism.  Abinales 
comments about the nature of the organization by stating, “The MDA’s most important 
drawback, however, was that once it received its budget allocation in 1964, it quickly 
became an instrument for patronage and patrimonial control.”142  The purpose of the 
organization was to garner the support of political and business leaders to create 
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cooperation and economic opportunity within Mindanao.  The result, due to its prolonged 
dormancy and ineffective structuring, was the opposite.  Abinales states, “The MDA 
itself, as well as the direction of Mindanao’s development, fell into the hands of local 
politicians.”143   
 What has been seen in the Philippines is the development of a patrimonial state 
based on the cultural tendencies of the society.  Eric Budd best categorizes the nature of 
the Philippines stating, “Policies end up promoting particularistic interests, rather than 
national interests,” continuing, “Patrimonial leaders tend to promote those industries that 
enjoy close ties to themselves or their associates.”144  Special considerations given by 
political leaders are received by institutions regardless of capability or efficacy.  The 
connections and personal ties are more important than performance and accountability.  
Patrimonial states are characterized by those in power vying for a “slice of the pie” rather 
than actual concerns over representation of constituency and meaningful legislation.  
They also tend to create a system of impotence and ineptitude and prevent effective state 
planning.   
 Outlined above are only two, of many, examples of opportunities for the equal 
development of the Philippine state being squandered. Cultural values of favoring 
personal ties, kinship, and alliances coupled with the lack of government oversight and 
crony capitalism led to the misappropriation or outright theft of the funds given to these 
organizations. In the end, corruption superceded the opportunity to fully develop the 
Mindanao region and created a lasting void in what will be the basis for the conflict, 
violence, and Muslim unrest which is soon to occur.   
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Philippine Islamic Culture 
 Philippine Muslim culture, like many traditional Islamic societies, has been 
organized into families and tribal structures.  In the Mindanao area, these tribes and 
families hold significant political and social influence.145  It’s an environment where 
killing, violence, and intimidation are commonplace.  Family warring, or rido, threatens 
uninvolved family members and community members.  Torres defines rido as, “a state of 
reoccurring hostilities between families and kinship groups characterized by a serious of 
retaliatory acts of violence carried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice.”146  The 
Philippine Muslim warrior is an individual who defends the name and image of their 
family.  Kessler states, “The (Philippine) culture also promotes a virulent struggle for 
power among individuals as they fight to raise their status,” and that, “higher status 
confers greater control over resources and hence greater rewards.”147  The reach of the 
tribes and families in these regions go far beyond just social influence.  These families 
also usually have deep economic and political ties.  Amongst Muslim communities in the 
Philippines, disputes are usually settled by which tribe or family has the most political 
affiliations.  Often conflict escalates to violence and killings, rido and can peacefully end 
through ceasefire traditions called kanduri, or family feasts where public apologies are 
traded.  Aggression and intimidation also extends into the education and electoral 
systems causing an exaggerated amount of electoral violence in both the country and the 
ARMM.148 This environment is a very unstable and uncertain atmosphere and stands as 
an obstacle for development and social peace.   
 Family and clan feuding is a product of weak and ineffective institutions.  Rido is 
characterized by intermittent violence, often retaliatory in nature, between families.  This 
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violence most usually occurs in areas where there is a lack of a legal authority and 
security.149  It also affects Philippine unrest and the feuds of the militias, Torres states, 
“Rido has wider implications for conflict in Mindanao primarily because it tends to 
interact in unfortunate ways with separatist conflict and other forms of armed violence.” 
He continues by saying, “Many armed confrontations in the past involving insurgent 
groups and the military were actually triggered by a local rido.”150  Two examples of this 
were the 2004 Dapiawan incident and the 2005 violence in Linantangan; both of which 
included involvement of the AFP, the MILF, and civilian volunteer organizations (CVO) 
or private civilian militias.  This type of feuding is not isolated to the Philippine Muslim 
community; family feuding has been seen in the Cordilleras, in Northern Luzon, and in 
Ilocos between the Crisologo and Sinson clans.  The cultural aspects that have lead to 
patrimonial and ineffective nature of the Philippine institutions (which are the 
mechanisms that ensures for liberal institutionalism peace) have played a major role in 
allowing the Philippine Muslim community to become fractioned and unstable.   
 The geographic setting and the quality of life in the Philippines were contributory 
factors but were found to have not affected Muslim unrest as much as the other variables 
considered.   
 
Culture Affecting Conflict Resolution Approach 
 The way the two parties have interacted with each other has undoubtedly affected 
the way outcome of the current state of the conflict.  Conflict resolution and peace studies 
scholars have recognized three broad approaches used to resolve conflicts and disputes.  
These three approaches focus on the parties seeking to bring together primary interests, to 
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determine who is right according to legal standards, and the party which is able to wield 
more power through a power contest.151  The cultural tendencies outlined above have 
shaped the way the two parties have dealt with each other.  To fully understand how and 
why Philippine Muslim unrest has risen and fallen, an analysis of the conflict resolution 
approaches and how they have been employed must be looked at.  The way Filipinos and 
their government have dealt with the contending party has greatly affected the outcomes 
of the conflict, influencing the extent and the length of the damage and destruction.   
 The three approaches are referred to as interest-based, the rights-based, and the 
power-based.  Individually each of these is insufficient in solving the conflict.  However, 
when the approaches are used together peaceful outcomes can be possible.   
 The conflict resolution approaches played a major role in understanding the 
nature of the interaction between the parties involved and give explanation to why and 
how each side is operating.  The interest-based approach is the most lasting and least 
destructive of all three of the approaches and is ideal in creating lasting resolutions.  
These solutions are based on common ground for both parties and produce outcomes 
where both parties benefit.  This approach is associated with cooperation and finding 
solutions that bridge the party’s differences and produces the highest level of shared 
satisfaction from the outcome.152  The rights-based approach attempts to find which party 
is right by some principle of measurement.  In most cases international or domestic legal 
law provide the basis for negotiation and leads one party to benefit more than the other.  
The third approach is the power-based approach can lead to all-out war, but can also be 
seen in more mild versions.  The conflict between the Philippine government and the 
MNLF and the MILF can easily categorized by the power-based approach.  Both with 
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military shows of strength and power-based approach political tactics have been 
employed in the Philippine conflict.  This is a significant reason for the failure of the 
negotiations between the parties.  The failure to evolve to the rights-based and interest-
based approaches has impeded the negotiations between the parties and has only 
perpetuated the usage of the power approach of spells of violence and tough negotiations.   
 None of these can act alone and sometimes all three are seen throughout different 
stages of a conflict.  There is a preferred ordering of the three approaches, as Connie Peck 
in Sustainable Peace points out, “The search for sustainable peace will therefore need to 
be based on the establishment of the rule of law (a rights-based approach) and the 
institutionalization of problem solving (an interest-based approach) to replace violent 
conflict (a power-based approach).”153  William L. Ury describes this as three concentric 
circles where interests are in the center, rights in the middle, and power on the outside, as 
seen in the chart below.154 
 
 
Figure 5: Conflict Resolution Approaches 
 
This illustration shows how the three approaches work together and often one approach 
cannot be employed without implementation of the others.   
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 In the Philippines, approaches that have been focused on interests and rights have 
been either non-existent or relatively unsuccessful.  When they were used, particularly 
the rights-based approach based on the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, it has been an essentially 
a masked use of the power-based approach through the referencing of rights.  More often 
than not, resorting to war, violence, and power struggling has been the norm.  This was 
seen not only on the battlefield but also at the negotiating table.  
  Though Philippine Muslim unrest dates back to the Spanish and American 
colonial periods, the desiring of a separate Islamic state and the present root of today’s 
conflict did not emerge until the 1960’s and 70’s.  Around this time in Mindanao, 
conflicts between Muslim farmers and Christian landowners became increasingly violent 
and the first formations of paramilitary groups were seen.  In 1969, the MNLF was 
formed by a University of the Philippines professor named Nur Misuari.  The MNLF 
claimed that the government was systematically conducting genocide against the Moro 
people and called for a separate Moro state.  This led to full scale war in 1972; with 
President Ferdinand Marcos declaring martial law.  The first period of this war employed 
the power-based approach with most of the conflict occurring on the battle field, killing 
tens of thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands.155  To finance the purchasing of 
arms and other military materials, the MNLF mobilized funds from international sources.  
One of the largest backers of the MNLF during this time was Mu’ammar Gadhafi, leader 
of Libya and outspoken supporter of a united Arab nation.  Many peace negotiations 
collapsed because of the continual decision to use power and show of force, rather than to 
the peace talks and finding a solution based around rights or interests.   
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 The power-based approach went from the battle field to the political field in the 
years to come.  The lesser empowered of the two negotiating groups the MNLF looked to 
swing the power in favor of their organization by taking the political matter to the 
international level.  Already garnishing support from many Muslim countries in the way 
of funding, military training, and arms procurement the MNLF looked to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to politically back the formation of the 
independent Philippine Muslim state, known as the Bangsamoro Republik.  The full 
support of the OIC in the creation of the Bangsamoro Republik was not obtained as the 
MNLF desired.  However, the OIC did pass a 1974 resolution concerning the MNLF’s 
plight which urged the Philippine government to find a mutually beneficial political and 
peaceful solution with the MNLF.  Unfortunately for the MNLF, the resolution called for 
a solution “within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Philippines.”156  The power-based struggle between the two parties continued.  
Through the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and to the end of the Marcos era in 1986, the 
contest for power between the two parties exemplified the nature of the power-based 
approach.  According to Quimpo, “The two sides engaged in a politico-diplomatic 
struggle and on-off military struggle, each side engaging in tactics and ploys, maneuvers 
and counter-maneuvers, as in a chess game, to compel the other side to give in to the 
other’s demands or make concessions.”157  
 Hopes of moving out of the well-worn routine of the power-based approach 
peaked with the election of Corazon Aquino, wife of slain MNLF supporter and anti-
Marcos senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.  To much chagrin, after attempts to create genuine 
dialogue between the two parties (including the 1987 Jeddah Accord, signed in Jeddah, 
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Saudi Arabia), the nature of the talks reverted back to a power over rights contest.158  
This shift, though much less violent in nature, still did not provide the foundation for a 
lasting solution.  Aquino pushed for the creation of an autonomous region consisting of 
eight provinces, which was later changed to ten, in spite of MNLF leader Misuari’s 
disapproval.  A mix between rights and power-based approach allowed Aquino to refer to 
the Tripoli Agreement as a way to deter the MNLF’s full acceptance into the IOC (much 
like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has received full membership despite 
reaching sovereign state status).  Aquino’s claim was that a Muslim Mindanao was in line 
with the intentions and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement, which was signed and used as 
another power tactic by the Philippine government.  Marcos added a clause in a last-
minute wrangling which stated, “The Philippine government shall take all necessary 
constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.”159  This clause 
was used to ensure that the creation of the autonomous Mindanao happened within the 
Philippine constitution.  
 The ARMM was officially signed into law in 1989 by Aquino, despite boycotts of 
both the MNLF and MILF, and was only supported by four of the ten provinces of the 
Region.160  The power approach to use the “rights” outlined in the Tripoli Agreement to 
“legally” create the ARMM was enough to appease the OIC in deferring the full 
membership of the MNLF and reluctantly forced the MNLF acceptance of the ARMM 
political structure.  Now with the OIC not accepting the full sovereignty of the 
Bangsamoro Republik, President Fidel V. Ramos used the OIC to mediate talks between 
the two parties.  Eventually, while still adhering to the power approach, in 1996 a peace 
agreement was signed between the two parties with finalized the plan that was outlined in 
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the Tripoli Agreement and solidified the political foundation for the fourteen provinces 
and nine cities within the ARMM.  To placate and integrate the MNLF into the new 
system, top members were given positions within two newly formed governmental arms 
the Consultive Assembly and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD).161  Misuari was made SPCPD chairman and was the eventual 
governor of the ARMM, while much of the ex-guerillas and military men of the MNLF 
were integrated into the AFP.     
 The power-based approached did not stop at the creation of the ARMM, and has 
taken on as the accepted “default” approach taken by the two sides when tensions heat 
up.  The fragile cycle of peace negotiations and violence that lead up to one of the most 
deadly government campaigns known as “the all out war,” illustrates this.  Starting from 
the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF (which the 
MILF did not agree with), the two parties were engaged in peace negotiations to try to 
find a resolution to the hostilities, though these were mostly informal in nature.  This 
peace agreement was broken, and then a new ceasefire agreement emerged in July 1997.  
In October 1999, the Philippine government and the MILF opened up formal talks at the 
Da’wah Center, only six miles away from MILF’s headquarters Camp Abubakar, in 
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.162 The years leading to these formal negotiations were 
marked with ceasefire agreements, the breaking of those agreements with spats of 
violence (ever-increasing in nature during this period), and then reinstatement of 
ceasefires.  Just months after the formal talks opened, the most intense fighting between 
the two parties erupted and then-President Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out-war” 
campaign against the MILF.  Within six months all major MILF camps were captured 
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and the MILF was all but defeated.  During this time, the two head negotiators continued 
to meet and persisted in trying to come up with a rights-based or interest-based solution.  
None was found.  Though warring seemed to be finished, in the week that followed the 
capture of Camp Abubakar there were guerilla type attacks by the MILF that occurred in 
a public market in a small farming village that killed 21 and against government forces.  
It was clear that the MILF was not completely destroyed, rather, they were able to avoid 
most of the clashes with the superior Philippine government forces and have firmly 
entrenched themselves for the prolonged guerilla style war seen today.    
 The power-based approach as seen throughout the Philippine government, MNLF, 
and MILF interaction is another example of its weakness in producing long-term 
solutions.  Being the least cost-effective and least successful in creating satisfactory (and 
therefore lasting) outcomes, the power-based approach is one of the major contributing 
factors to why there is still a large sentiment of malcontent amongst the Philippine 
Muslim community.  The Philippine government was able to exercise the most power of 
the parties involved.  Through last-minute clauses included in the Tripoli Agreement and 
the employment of sly power-based strategy, the Philippine government extended the 
violent struggle from the battlefield to the negotiating table.  The Philippine government 
was successful in seeing their political vision through.  The drawback of this is the lack 
of lasting contentment in the political structure imposed by the Philippine government.  
Throughout the creation of the ARMM, the MNLF and Nur Misuari, the representative of 
the Muslim community, disagreed with the resolutions and the way they were being 
implemented.  The MILF became a major player in the conflict mainly because of its 
accumulation of military capacity that made it impossible for the Philippine government 
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to ignore.  This political power-based assertion of the MILF was eventually countered 
with the power-based approach by Marcos’ all-out-war.163  Again, using the power-based 
approach, these two parties participated in a long and government resource draining 
engagement destroying political, social, and human capital.    
 The continued prolonged use of the power-based approach to conflict resolution 
throughout the entire conflict and the lack of support of its eventual “solution” (the 
creation of the ARMM), are major reasons for the continuing unrest seen in the 
Philippine Muslim community today.  Regardless of the economic and political 
developments and historical evolution, the quality of interaction between the warring 
parties lead to arrangements that have left the door open to future Muslim unrest and 
conflict.  Culture is the most pervasive influencing factor that was found throughout this 
research.  
 
International Relations Theory 
 The IR theories examined throughout this research were illiberal democracies, 
liberal institutionalism, and Marxist theory.  These three theories fit together nicely and 
explain the situation in the Philippines.  Zakaria’s illiberal democracy theory focuses on 
democracies that do not feature liberal constitutionalism; and therefore have democracies 
that are not founded on the protection of individual liberty.  Illiberal democracies 
suppress public opinion, economic growth, and rational legal institutions and often 
feature unaccountable centralized governments.  Liberal institutionalism outlines the use 
of institutions as a mechanism in which peace can be achieved.  Without institutions that 
are responsive to public opinion, there is no legal way for public discontent to be 
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expressed.  The Philippines is lacking these rational accountable institutions.  Decades of 
corruption, misused funds, lack of representation, and failed development plans have 
created a country with significant economic stratification.  This is where Marxist theory 
can explain the conflict in the Philippines.  Marxist revolutionary theory outlines violent 
conflict between two economic classes as a result of disenfranchisement and exploitation 
of the poor laboring class.  In an illiberal democracy like the Philippines, institutions that 
provide legal mechanisms to address and accommodate public discontent are non 
existent.  
 
Illiberal Democracy 
 Zakaria’s theory of illiberal democracies describes the Philippine situation.  There 
is a distinction between liberal democracies that limit the power of government and 
ensure the rights of the minority groups, despite majority will, and illiberal democracies 
that accumulate and use government power to represent the majority will or to benefit the 
most powerful.  Illiberal democracies are marked with cronyism, corruption, 
patrimonialism, and the lack of safeguards protecting individual liberty.  By examining 
genuine democracy (whether it is merely a state election or if there are more substantial 
prerequisites) Zakaria contends that the most important aspect to liberal democracy is a 
liberal constitution.   
 Illiberal democracies produce failed states.  The leaders of these countries often 
assert that the centralization of authority is needed to break down feudal ties, split 
traditional coalitions and allegiances, and to bring an overall order to an otherwise 
turbulent society.164  This is seen in the Philippines and most clearly during the Marcos 
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era and was further legitimized because of the “democratic elections” that reinforced 
Marcos’ reign.  Illiberal democracies are often marked by authoritarian, all powerful 
governments that do not have tend to the sentiment of its people, especially the minority 
groups.  According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of political activists, journalists, 
and even students have “disappeared” or have been killed since 2001.  A United Nations 
Special Rapporteur had significant findings that indicated the involvement of Philippine 
military forces in many of these cases.165  An environment of intimidation, killings and 
kidnappings, and political corruption has been plaguing the Philippines for decades.   
 Illiberal democracies operate strikingly different than liberal democracies.  One 
misnomer is that democracy brings about ethnic peace and harmony, as illustrated with 
the Philippine example.  Zakaria states, “Mature liberal democracies can usually 
accommodate ethnic divisions without violence or terror and live in peace with other 
liberal democracies.”166  Illiberal democracies, like the Philippines, can incite conflict 
and war because of the lack of institutional protection of individual rights.   
 Zakaria cites scholars Rabushka and Shepsle who looked at Asian democracies in 
the 1960s and concluded that democracy in this region “is simply not viable in an 
environment of intense ethnic preferences.”167  In illiberal democracies where liberal 
constitutions are not present, the democracy seen can often give rise to exaggerated 
nationalism and war-mongering.  Zakaria also mentions that countries benefit from their 
richness in resources (be it through oil reserves, agriculture, or mineral) have a difficult 
time developing into stable liberal democracies because of the injection of wealth into the 
developmental system.  Unearned wealth, holistic development such as growth in the 
bureaucratic system, political institutions, legal institutions, industrial sector, and 
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infrastructure is difficult to achieve because of the lack of its necessity.  If the goal of a 
government is to accrue resources and gather wealth, then Zakaria states, “In a country 
with no resources, for the state to get rich, society has to get rich so that the government 
can then tax this wealth.”168 Such is the case in the Philippines.  The decade following 
independence was an economic period of statistical growth in the country.  This was 
mainly due to the privileged access the Philippines enjoyed to US markets from 
independence agreements that were formulated in 1946.  These agreements allowed for 
Philippine exports to enjoy unchallenged access to the robust US economy.  Rice exports 
were at an all-time high and overall agricultural exports were some of the highest in Asia.  
Unfortunately, this acted as a crutch and gave the Philippine a false sense of economic 
development.  The unfettered access to the US market caused Philippine economic 
growth to go forward without taking proper steps to ensure sustainability.  Once the 
agreements with the US ended, the world economic market immediately put pressure on 
Philippine products that the economy could not withstand.  From here, economic growth 
declined greatly.      
 Though illiberal democracy theory does not fully account for Philippine Muslim 
unrest, when analyzed in partnership with other IR theories it better explains the situation 
in the Philippines.   Illiberal democracy theory gives details to why the Philippine 
government is unable to properly address the needs of its people and its overall 
institutional ineffectiveness.     
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Liberal Institutionalism 
 Liberal institutionalism successfully explains the Philippine situation in a few 
different ways and is strengthened by understanding illiberal democracy theory.  
Liberalist theory puts value in democratic institutions that protect the principles of 
liberty, justice, toleration, and order.  The belief that human nature can be perfectible 
makes liberal institutionalists to calls for democracy and democratic institutions to ensure 
peace and order. 169  By taking into consideration transnational groups and international 
organizations liberalism sees more than just states as political actors.  Because of this, 
cooperation and the ability to establish systems and institutions where cooperation can be 
achieved are of utmost importance.  The theory relies on institutions to provide an outlet 
for mediation, public outcry, and political change.  Baylis states, “Order in world politics 
emerges not from a balance of power but from the interactions between many layers of 
governing arrangements, comprising laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and 
institutional rules.”170  The key to this is that the institutions must be responsive to these 
factors and should be a way for the people to create change within their society.  As seen 
in the Philippines, this is not the case.  The institutional ineffectiveness and lack of proper 
mechanisms to address and respond to public complaints have left the Philippine people 
without ways to express or represent their discontent.        
 International and domestic institutions are efficient ways to settle disputes that 
would have previously escalated to violence.  On the individual human level, Filipinos 
are not offered individual liberty.  On the state level, the cause of conflict is the 
undemocratic nature of politics and balance of power and the government’s inability to 
respond to public sentiment.171   
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 Liberal institutionalism, by itself, falls short in explaining the Philippine situation 
because it does not consider a handful of factors; such as the effects of despotic dictators 
who manipulate their institutions, the danger of institutional responsiveness to majority 
will, the effects of economic isolation, and the existence of ethnic conflict.  For liberal 
institutionalists, the establishment of structures to ensure governmental responsiveness is 
essential and can lead to lasting peace.  However, in the Philippine situation, this theory 
doesn’t take into account all the factors that are present.  Liberal institutionalism 
establishes the importance for the creation of institutions that are responsive to public 
outcry that can act as a mechanism to circumvent conflict or violence.  In an environment 
that Zakaria’s theory of illiberal democracy explains, the needs of the institutions that are 
called for through liberal institutionalism are not present.   
  Because of the lack of oversight of rational legal institutions, corruption, 
nepotism, and crony capitalism are the seen to be the norm in the Philippines.  Influential 
families operate with little regard to legal punishment which has created not only a state 
that lacks government institutional responsiveness and legal mechanisms to address 
public dissention, but also has created a country of stark differences in resource 
ownership and accessibility. 
 
Marxism 
 A critical examination of Marxist theory shows that when used in the context of 
illiberal democracy and liberal institutionalism theory, it adds to the understanding of the 
Philippine situation significantly.  An illiberal democracy in the Philippines has created a 
state that has weak institutions that are not responsive to the people’s needs in a legal 
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way.  Marxism is able to account for certain aspects of the conflict but also falls shorts in 
some areas.  In the context of illiberal democracies and liberal institutionalism, Marxism 
provides a structure to understand why the Philippines transitioned into violence.   
 Marxists believe that all political events are influenced by underlying economic 
concerns.  Through my findings, Marxist theory falls short because there are too many 
religious, cultural, social, and militaristic aspects of the conflict to conclude that it’s 
merely a product of the economic struggle.  The conflict and Muslim unrest are more 
than just economics.  As seen in the political development section above, the tumultuous 
political history of the country cannot be dismissed.  Marxist school of thought also 
ignores the impact of the role of the military in the country.  The role of the military in 
Philippine politics is extremely unique and the memory of the 1986 People Power 
Movement I ousting of the Marcos Regime and the 2001 People Power Movement II are 
etched into the ethos of the Philippine people.  Marxist theory also does not consider the 
significance of ethnic groups in the world system mainly because Karl Marx based his 
theories on 19th century Europe.  Conflict between ethnic groups emerged primarily after 
WWII and the Cold War, so it was implausible for Marx to account for this new 
phenomenon.  This is why a combination of liberal democracy theory, liberal 
institutionalism, and Marxism is effective in analyzing the nature of this conflict.  
 Marxist theory properly explains the revolutionary action that was taken by the 
laboring Philippine Muslim community.  As noted in an earlier chapter, Dougherty 
comments that Marxist peace is defined as, “The peace of the self-alienated person 
restored as a result of the ‘negation of the negation,’ the revolutionary self-appropriation 
by the proletariat, taking that which rightfully belongs to itself.”172  Marxism gives great 
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insight to how the conflict between the Philippine Christians and the Muslims was 
ignited.   
 Marxists would blame extreme wealth disparity and resource ownership (as a 
result of liberal institutionalism and illiberal democracy) as a major reason for 
malcontent.  This was the case in the Philippines starting after independence and is still 
seen today.  Throughout the 1990s and into the newest century, a small number of 
Filipino elite families and business owners owned a vastly disproportionate portion of the 
Philippine resources.  In the 1990s, the poorest 40 percent of the county only owned 13 
percent of the national income; with the richest 20 percent taking home well over 50 
percent.  During this time, the poorest 20 percent only accounted for 4.7 percent of the 
national income.173  According to Lynn M. Kwiatkowski in Struggling with 
Development: The Politics of Hunger and Gender in the Philippines, “Social inequality 
perpetuated by Filipino elites has included starkly unequal landownership patters, 
reinforced by government’s neglect to implement a genuine agrarian reform program to 
benefit the majority of small landowning and landless peasants.”  Continuing that, “This 
situation (of great wealth disparity) has translated into differential access to basic 
resources among members of the Philippine social classes, including access to food and 
agricultural land.”174 
 The illiberal democratic nature of the Philippine state and its lack of institutional 
integrity caused failed land settlement, infrastructure, and economic initiatives.  These 
blundered attempts to tap into the resources of Mindanao lined the pockets of the wealthy 
Filipino families and widened the wealth disparity gap in the country.  These programs 
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had little to no effect on bridging the prosperity difference between the Christian and 
Filipino Muslims.   
 These events helped escalate the discontent of the Muslim people as the farmers 
of the south were becoming increasing exploited by their new Christian settlers.  To no 
surprise, and as Marx theory would have predicted, this was an environment where the 
wealthy were reaping the benefits of the laboring class while the labors were being 
increasingly marginalized.  These failed development plans brought the inequality in 
plain site of the Muslim community.  Violence escalated and the creation of a sovereign 
Muslim state was attempted.  Marxist theory significantly explains the revolutionary 
action taken and the pursuing unrest by the isolated and underrepresented community.  
Decades of inadequate institutions and illiberal democratic rule has left the Philippine 
Muslims at a considerably lower economic rung than its Christian neighbors.  Marxism 
states that the economically depressed are the ones who revolt against the wealthy and 
explains why the Philippine Muslims were likely to rebel.  The extreme polarization in 
the access to resources in Luzon and Mindanao and the dramatic polarization of wealth 
disparity in Mindanao, mixed with the under-representation and the lack of legal 
procedure to address their issues, explain the cycle of violence seen in the Philippines.   
 Marxist theory properly explains the revolutionary mindset of the Philippine 
Muslims and its continuing unrest.  Decades of illiberal democratic rule has led to failed 
economic policy and programs, considerable wealth disparity between the two classes, 
and an unbalanced system of political representation.  This, combined with the lack of 
accountable, rational institutions allowing for the Philippine Muslims to voice their 
discontent have left the Philippine Muslim community with feelings of restlessness that 
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eventually erupted into violence.  When pushed to the economic edge, the laboring 
proletariat (Muslim farmers) and the resource owning bourgeoisie (Christian landowners) 
clashed.  Marxism explains the revolutionary, conflictual nature of Philippine Muslim 
reaction by supplementing the illiberal democracy and liberal institutionalist theories.  
 
Prospects for the Future 
 Through this research, many aspects of the Philippines were examined; they are 
the historical evolution, economic and political development, socio-cultural setting, 
geographic setting, and the quality of life.  From the research, the historical evolution of 
the country plays a significant factor in Philippine Muslim unrest, but explains more 
about how the situation has evolved and is much less relevance in predicting and 
prescribing solutions in today’s conflict.  The economic and political development, 
though a major factor, was not the most significant variable causing Philippine Muslim 
unrest.  The differing economic development between Luzon, the location of the seat of 
governance, and the ARMM contributes to the isolation and disparate growth of the two 
regions.  This accounts for much of the Philippine Muslim unrest, but not fully.   
 Through the research, the most pervasive causal factor to Philippine Muslim 
unrest and to the prolonged conflict is the socio-cultural setting.  Zakaria categorizes the 
Philippines as an illiberal democracy that created an environment of corruption and 
ineffectual leadership.  Liberal institutionalism highlights the importance of institutions 
based on individual rights which are responsive to public opinion, which are not present 
in the Philippines.  Within this environment, Marxist theory of revolution finds its 
relevance.  Throughout this examination, when looking at the many of the factors in the 
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lack of economic development, much of the failures revealed stem from a culture that 
lends itself to informal and often corrupt institutions.  An illiberal democracy based on 
cronyism and patrimonialism stands as a large obstacle to quelling Muslim and social 
unrest and uncertainty.  Throughout this research, certain cultural tendencies guided 
decisions and altered the course of events more so than any other single variable.   
 
Short-Term 
 There are two short-term issues that the country faces.  The first issue is the threat 
of the terrorist ASG, an issue that the US has mentioned as a part of the war on terror, 
and the second issue is to revive negotiations between the two sides in a new way.   
 Addressing the ASG is of utmost importance to state, regional, and international 
security.  Continuing attacks and kidnappings by ASG have grabbed international 
headlines and have further strained the relations between Philippine Muslims and its 
Christian counterparts.  The March 2004 ASG bombing of the Aboitiz Superferry in 
Manila Bay killed 134, the 2004 and 2005 ASG attacks on Manila’s transport 
infrastructure killed 120, and the 2006 series of ASG motorcycle assignations and 
kidnappings killed roughly 70.175  Though much of the Philippine Muslim community 
does not condone the tactics of ASG, the impacts of their actions are felt by all Filipinos 
in the ARMM and throughout the country.  A different approach needs to be used and 
there needs to be a distinction made between insurgent groups (such as the MNLF and 
MILF) and terrorist groups (ASG).  The two groups can be distinguished by their selected 
targets of aggression, negotiable goals, control of political infrastructure, and influence 
they have on the Muslim populous.176  The ASG is composed of small groups of alliances 
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who circle around charismatic leaders and attempt to maximize their reputation for 
violence.  The International Crisis Group contends that “The ASG is not an insurgency in 
the same sense as the MILF or the MNLF,” and that their need for violence is unique for 
their group.  They state, “The greater the violence, the bigger the pay-off, in terms of 
higher ransom payments and foreign funds.” 177  This violence undertaken by the terrorist 
ASG, seen as Muslim on Christian violence, greatly strains and weakens the positions of 
the MILF and the MNLF and needs to be addressed in a significantly different manner. 
 One mechanism that provides hope by encouraging cooperation between the 
Philippine government and the MILF has been the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), 
a terrorist intelligence sharing group to minimize accidental violence between the two 
parties – though currently only set up between the Philippine Government and the MILF.  
The AHJAG was made operational in 2005, went through a period of dormancy the 
second half of 2007 and has since been relatively pushed aside.  When in operation, it 
was successful in separating the terrorist activities of the ASG from the MILF and 
successfully pushed the ASG elements out of the insurgency group.  The AHJAG needs 
to be used and reinforced as an effective, terrorist-fighting mechanism through the 
cooperation of both sides.  It also needs to be expanded to include the MNLF.   
 Alternatively, if the power-based approach is employed to combat ASG, just as it 
was employed by the struggle between the Philippine government and the MNLF and the 
MILF, no satisfactory solution will be found.  For over three decades of fighting between 
the Philippine government and Muslim military groups the power-based approach has 
been unable to lead to lasting peace in the ARMM.  This could only lead to further 
terrorist attacks and violence.  According to Quimpo, an approach like this would “most 
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likely only drive uncaptured rebels to join the undefeated rebel group – or start a new 
one.”178  This would be a step in the opposite direction to creating lasting peace in the 
ARMM.  Cooperation is needed to address the ASG. 
 The second short-term issue is rehashing the peace negotiations in a new way.  A 
step in the right direction to the creation of a lasting peace agreement between the 
Filipino government and the MNLF and MILF would be the use of non power-based 
approaches in an internationally-backed peace agreement.  The use of AHJAG without 
tangible benefits at the negotiating table for the MILF (and hopefully eventually the 
MNLF) will only undermine the trust between the two sides and would lead to its 
ineffectiveness.  As of May 2008, there are no negotiations between the two sides about 
the self-determination of the Mindanao people.179  The prolonged adherence to the 
power-based approach has led to destruction and the death of thousands of Filipinos and a 
transition from this to the rights- and interest-based approaches will have immediate 
results.  In the past, quasi rights-based approaches have been implemented with limited 
success, mainly because of the lack of legitimacy of the institutions in the country.  Peace 
agreements and right-based approaches in the past have been very much intertwined with 
the power-based approach that often times it has been difficult to decipher one approach 
from the other; resulting in tenuous peace agreements and ceasefires.   
 One practical way to address this issue is to use the international community to 
act as a mediator; ideally a group of or a single liberal democracy.  This would bring in a 
third-party institution that would help negotiate based on individual rights.  The OIC has 
attempted to take on this role in the past with limited success.  Almost all of the fifty-
seven states of the OIC are, themselves, working on becoming liberal democracies.  This 
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undermines their capability to produce legal agreements or to be the enforcers of such 
agreements.  Lewis states, “Of the fifty-seven member states of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, only one, the Turkish Republic, has operated democratic institutions 
over a long period of time and, despite difficult and ongoing problems, has made progress 
in establishing a liberal economy and a free society and political order.” 180 Moreover, the 
OIC lost credibility by failing to have interceded in the 1979 Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan, the civil wars in both Somalia and Sudan, and the 1980-89 war between Iran 
and Iraq.181 As of May 2008, there was no current intervention by the OIC.182  From 
October 2004 to this year, the IMT has been overseeing the peace agreements between 
the two parties.  This group consisted of specialists from Brunei and Malaysia and despite 
their best efforts a lasting solution was not found during their intervention.  
 The use of a non-biased organization with a history of liberal democracy and 
liberal constitutionalism is very important for the creation of a lasting solution.  One such 
example of this was in Northern Ireland where decades of conflict were ended with the 
involvement of the international community.  With the help of Canada, the US, and 
Finland, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning helped oversee 
and confirm the demilitarizing of the warring factions.  If the Philippine conflict were 
given the same opportunity and attention as the conflict in Northern Ireland or if the 
opportunity arose for US intervention – much like that seen at the 2000 Camp David 
Summit between Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak, and Yasser Arafat (though failed) – a lasting 
peace agreement can be reached.  By involving respected international mediation, the 
Philippines can bypass the underlying problem of a culture that often runs contrary to 
rational legal institutions and interest-based negotiations.    
99 
  The use of cooperation to address the threat of the ASG and the reimplementation 
of the peace negotiation in a new way will lead to the country on the right path to address 
Philippine Muslim unrest.   
 
Long-Term 
 A long-term solution to Philippine Muslim unrest would be to transform 
Philippine culture to embrace and demand rational legal institutions (a move toward 
liberal constitutionalism and liberal democracy).  Kessler characterizes the integration of 
society with kinship ties as, “fragmented cooperation, among individuals rather than 
groups, favoring particularistic behavior and dyadic alliances and making the concept of 
national welfare difficult to accept,” and that, “the culture tends to isolate groups; rather 
than bridging social gulfs it increases social distance, with cooperation among individuals 
intensifying rather than reducing conflict between individual alliances.”183  Philippine 
culture leads to the isolation of groups and patron-client relationships and provides the 
basis for illiberal democratic rule.   
 Shifting from the employment of the power-based approach to one that is interest-
based would be a step in the right direction to transform the country from an illiberal 
democracy to a society based on liberal constitutionalism.  An obstacle to this is that the 
Filipino culture carries a strong tradition of addressing threats in a forceful manner and to 
favor friends and allies.  Rights-based peace agreements and ceasefires could help find a 
lasting solution; however, when employed as a means to extend the tactics of a power-
based approach or just another action by an illiberal democracy to consolidate 
government power, the results will only be temporal.  An honest assessment and 
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acceptance of the nature of Philippine culture must be examined in order to break the 
same destructive cycle.    
According to economist Eric Budd, “The weakness of the Philippine bureaucracy 
represents a major stumbling block to efforts to promote economic development,” and 
continues with, “The Philippine developmental experience seems to support the 
hypothesis that patrimonial states will be unable to engage in constructive, developmental 
activities.”184 The tradition of palakasan, or being immune from legal prosecution 
because of knowing someone in power, has created institutions that are not rational-legal 
bureaucracies. The irregularity and unpredictability of a government loaded with 
patrimonial tendencies makes it nearly impossible for the implementation for any 
development or peace plans.  The cultural tendencies of the use of force when addressing 
members outside of one’s own group and the propensity to orient to favor small groups of 
allies bound by personal ties have lead to a culture that is rife with corruption and 
nepotism.  This has significantly affected the viability of the country on many levels.  
Altering the underlying culture of a people is a tough prescription for change and is not 
one that can be achieved overnight; but it can happen.  The recommendation that Budd 
suggests is a transformation from patrimonial tendencies to rational-legal institutions.  
Institutions that are free and insulated from the influences of corruption, nepotism, and 
cronyism.  Budd states, “Capitalism requires the depersonalization of economic and 
political activity, so that economic decision-making can be based upon rational, profit-
seeking considerations,” and that, “Such a depersonalization of the political and 
economic realms represents the antithesis of the patrimonial state,” a patrimonial state 
such as the Philippines.185  
101 
Fortunately, culture can change.  Zakaria contends that culture plays a huge role 
in a country’s progression by either speeding it up or inhibiting change.  Culture can 
stand as a major obstacle because it can embed itself into institutions and practices.  It has 
caused the Filipinos to favor friends and close allies, to use force when addressing 
outside groups, and the acceptance of a hierarchical social structure.  It has also been a 
causal factor in the economic and political underdevelopment, tribal social structuring, 
existence of patron-client relationships, creation of a patrimonial state, and Philippine 
Muslim unrest.  Fortunately, culture can change.  Europe was once ultranationalist; and 
now it’s willing to surrender sovereignty to supranational cooperatives.  The US was at 
one time isolationist and highly apprehensive of standing armies; now its hegemonic 
superpower with military forces spread throughout the world.186  The Chinese, once 
traditional peasants, are now leading the world in technological innovation.  Cultural 
change has been more of a constant than the aberration throughout human history.  
Philippine cultural change through the transformation of its institutions towards ones that 
are based on liberal ideology, legality, and accountability can occur.  Zakaria states, “The 
West’s real advantage is that its history led to the creation of institutions and practices 
that, although in no sense bound up with Western genes, are hard to replicate from 
scratch in other societies…But it can be done.”187 
One potential factor for change could be rapid economic growth.  Substantial 
economic growth could come from opportunities from globalization, the promises of the 
free market, or regional economic ordering allowing for overall rapid economic growth. 
Economic growth could transform Philippine institutions into rational-legal 
institutions void of patrimonial tendencies and corruption and would change the nature of 
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the Philippine Muslim conflict.  Budd states, “For those states that use the challenge of 
globalization to strengthen their capacity, the economic future will be brighter,” and, “for 
those that don’t, the government officials and cronies will continue their predatory 
attacks, and national developmental goals will continue to be sacrificed to the 
particularistic interests of a few.”188  To fully harness this growth, increased international 
and regional economic cooperation would reinforce the need for accountability of the 
Philippine system.   
The squandered resources of mismanaged development initiatives and efforts 
have continued to leave the ARMM less developed as its Luzon neighbors.  By changing 
the attitude of the Filipino people, gradually Philippine culture can be changed towards 
accepting and demanding legal, rational, and accountable institutions free from 
corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and unaccountability.  This would transform the country 
into a tradition of legal constitutionalism and would provide for a lasting solution.  
Though it would take a longer period of time, this solution would give the Philippines the 
tools need to find lasting peace and sustainable development.   
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APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
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13th Century – Islam established in the Sulu Archipelago and moved through Mindanao. 
 
1521 
March 16: Ferdinand Magellen arrives in Cebu, Philippines and claims the land for the 
Spanish Charles I and names the islands after Crown Prince Philip. 
 
1565  
Islam expands to the Manila area. 
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi arrives in Cebu to create 1st Spanish settlement.   
 
1565 to 1666 
Four Moro Wars 
 
1565 to 1898 
Period of Spanish Colonialization 
 
1611 
Founding of the University of Santo Tomás in Manila. 
 
1718 to 1762 
The Fifth Moro War 
 
1744 
Rebellion in Bohol, lead by Francisco Dagohoy, keeps away the Spanish from the region 
until 1829. 
 
1762 
Rebellion in Ilocos, lead by Diego Silang, defeats the Spanish and proclaims an 
independent government and expels Spanish from Ilocos.   
 
1841 
Confradía de San José revolt.  
 
1851 to 1878 
Sixth Moro War 
 
1886 
Revolutionary Jose Rizal publishes Noli Me Tangre (Touch Me Not), a social and 
historical critique about Philippine society. 
 
1891 
Jose Rizal publishes sequel El Filibusterismo (The Subversive). The two bodies of work 
become a basis for the anti-Spanish revolution.   
 
1896 
Katipunan revolution emerges. 
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Jose Rizal is executed for his participation in the revolution. 
 
1898 
April: US declares war on Spain, occupy Manila by May. 
June: Philippine independence from Spanish, Emilio Aguinaldo becomes head of state. 
December 10: Treaty of Paris gives the Philippines to the US. 
 
1899 to 1903 
Philippine-American War leaves 4,000 American and 16,000 Filipino troops dead and 
200,000 Philippine civilians dead. 
 
1909 
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act by US Congress allows for Philippine goods to be shipped to 
the US, opening a prolonged economic partnership. 
 
1934 
Tyding-McDuffie Act by US Congress gives Philippines Commonwealth status and 
promises independence in 10 years.  
 
1935  
Philippines drafts constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 
 
1935 to 1945  
Manuel Quezon Presidency  
 
1941 
Japanese attack Philippines. 
 
1942 
US and Filipino forces retreat to Corregidor and Bataan and are defeated by May.   
Bataan Death March. 
 
1944 
General Douglas MacArthur lands with US forces in Leyte, Visayas. 
 
1945 
January: US forces land on Luzon 
September 22: Surrender of the Japanese. Manila is devastated, one million Filipinos 
estimated to be killed.  
 
1946 
July 4: Philippines granted independence from the US  
Philippine Trade Act (Bell Act) gives free trade assurances till 1954, then increased until 
1974.  
Philippine Rehabilitation Act supplies $620 million in post war funds. 
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1947 
US-Philippine agreement to establish 23 US military installations for a 99 year period. 
 
1946 to 1948 
 Manuel Roxas Presidency 
 
1948 to 1953  
Elpidio Quirin Presidency after Roxas heart attack 
 
1953 to 1957  
Ramon Magsaysay Presidency  
 
1955 
US-Philippine trade agreement revised.  Relinquished US control of the peso, extending 
the sugar economic agreement, and extending the period for the quota and tariff 
reduction of Philippine goods to the US. 
 
1957 to 1961 
Carlos P. Garcia Presidency 
 
1965 to 1986 
Ferdinand Marcos Presidency  
 
1966 
Revised US-Philippine military agreement changed US lease to 1991. 
 
1967 
Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) is formed. 
 
1969 
Creation of MNLF by Nur Misuari. 
Marcos is reelected. 
 
1971 
August 21: Grenade attack in Manila kills nine and wounds eight politicians.  Marcos 
suspends citizen’s rights to due process. 
 
1972 
September 21: Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law and suspends 1935 Constitution. 
December: Marcos orders the creation of small political assemblies called barangays. 
 
1978 
April: Elections under martial law are seen to be fraudulent with only 13 opposition seats 
are won. 
 
1980 
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January: Marcos called for snap local elections; his party wins 95 percent of the seats and 
is seen as fraudulent. 
May: Former Senator and Marcos oppositionist Benigno Aquino released to seek medical 
treatment in the US. 
 
1981 
January 17: Marcos ends martial law.  
June 16: First presidential election since 1969; Marcos remained as the only major 
candidate and claims 88 percent of the vote. 
 
1983 
August 21: Marcos opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. assassinated at the Manila 
International Airport upon return from US. 
 
1986 
February 7: Presidential election between Marcos and Corazon Aquino (wife of slain 
Benigno Aquino, Jr.); both declare themselves as winners. 
February 22: Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos 
and military elements begin revolt against Marcos.  
February 25: Marcos flees to Hawaii, Aquino elected president. 
July 6: Aquino travels to Mindanao; Arturo Tolentino (Marcos’ VP running mate) and 
350 soldiers take over the Manila Hotel.  Tolentino declares himself president, 
two days later it is peacefully resolved.   
December 10: 60 nationwide cease fire between National Democratic Front (NDF), 
associated with the CPP and AFP. 
 
1986 to 1992 
Corazon Aquino Presidency  
 
1987 
January 22: Kilusan ng Magbubukid sa Pilpinas (KMP), a peasant military and labor 
movement, lead ten to fifteen thousand protesters demanding land reform to 
Malacañang Palace; 20 killed at Mendiola Bridge. The NDF back the MNLF 
recent offensive against the AFP. 
January 27: Military troops state a coup attempt. 
April 18: Marcos loyalists are put down by military forces.  
August 2: Assassination of Jaimé Ferrer, a local government minister.   
August 28: Coup attempt lead by Col. Gregorio Honasan and several thousand soldiers; 
over 60 people die in failed attempt. 
September 27: Leader of political party Lean Alejandro is assassinated. 
October 28: Three US citizens are assassinated outside of Clark Air Base. 
 
1988 
January 18: Local elections in 62 of 73 provinces are marked by 136 deaths and 80 
percent participation.  
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1990 
Japanese economic bubble bursts 
August to March: Gulf War in Kuwait 
 
1992 
July: European Exchange Rate mechanism crisis 
 
1992 to 1998 
Fidel V. Ramos Presidency 
 
1994 
December: Mexican Peso crisis 
 
1995 
February: US Dollar depreciation/Yen appreciation 
 
1996 
September: Peace agreement between the MNLF and GRP.  Nur Misuari is named 
Governor of the ARMM.   
December: MILF rejects the peace agreement with GRP. 
 
1997  
July: Battle between MILF and AFP in North Cotabato leaving 150 dead and over 
110,000 displaced.  Agreement on the General  
 
1997  
Asian financial crisis ASIA  
 
1998 to 2001 
Joseph Estrada Presidency  
 
2000 
Former Erap ally accuses him of massive corruption; articles of impeachment filed by 
House of Representatives 
 
2001 
January: EDSA II, Erap allies keep bank records from being entered in as evidence and 
huge military and civilian protests erupt.  End of Estrada Presidency 
 
2001 to Present – Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Presidency 
 
2004  
March: ASG bombing of the Aboitiz Superferry in Manila bay killed 134 
 
2006  
Series of ASG motorcycle assignations and kidnappings killed roughly 70.   
114 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Conde, Carlos H.  “Clans Complicate Philippine Conflict.” New York Times. Asia Pacific Section. Oct 
28, 2007. 
2 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  
3 Majul, Cesar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  University of the Philippines Press.  Manila. 1999. 
4 Yah, Lim Chong.  Southeast Asia: The Long Road Ahead.  World Scientific Publishing.  Singapore.  
2001.   
5 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 23. 
6 Conde, Carlos H.  “Clans Complicate Philippine Conflict.” New York Times. Asia Pacific Section. Oct 
28, 2007. 
7 Bello, Walden, Herbert Docena, Marissa de Guzman and Mary Lou Malig.  The Anti-Development State. 
The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the 
Philippines.  2004. Pg. 276 
8 Azurin, Arnold M.  Beyond the Cult of Dissidence: In Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the 
Global Village.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  1996.  Pg. 268. 
9 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 23.  
10 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. The Philippines.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  
(http://www.iwgia.org/sw16701.asp). 
11 Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  The Asia 
Foundation.  2007. Pg. 7. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
12 Pinzon, Trina P.  January 20, 2008, interview with Trina P. Pinzon, former resident of Marawi City, 
Lanao Del Sur.  At the University of the Philippines, Diliman. 
13 Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  The Asia 
Foundation.  2007. Pg. 9. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
14 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of the 
Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science 
Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 6. 
15 Yah, Lim Chong.  Southeast Asia: The Long Road Ahead.  World Scientific Publishing.  Singapore.  
2001.  Pg 38.  
16 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.    
17 Gowing, Peter G.  “Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920.” Found in The Muslim 
Filipinos: Their History, Society, and Contemporary Problems.  Robert D. McAmis (ed.).  Manila.  
Solidaridad Publishing House.  Pg. 35.  
18 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 92. 
19 Zakaria, Fareed.  “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs.  Nov. 1997. 
20 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 22. 
21 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 105-106. 
22 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 99. 
23 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 101-102. 
24 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 103. 
115 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 104. 
26 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 114. 
27 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 114.  Referencing Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle’s 1972 work “Politics in 
Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability.”  (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merill).  
28 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. Norton & 
Company.  2004.  Pg. 74-75. 
29 Zakaria, Fareed.  “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs.  Nov. 1997. 
30 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 188. 
31 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 5. 
32 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 5. 
33 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 188. 
34 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 188. 
35 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 186. 
36 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 186. 
37 Sullivan, Michael P.  Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. Persistence.  Palgrave 
Macmillan.  2002.  Pg. 172. 
38 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  3rd 
Edition.  2001.  Pg. 5-6. 
39 Dougherty, James E.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive survey.  New 
York.  Longman.  4th Edition.  1997.  Pg. 216. 
40 Dougherty, James E.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive survey.  New 
York.  Longman.  4th Edition.  1997.  Pg. 217. 
41 Dougherty, James E.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive survey.  New 
York.  Longman.  4th Edition.  1997.  Pg. 218. 
42 Lewis, Bernard.  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.  New York.  Random House 
Publishing.  2004.  Pg. xix.   
43 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Philippines.  (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rp.html).  Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
44 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 56-57.   
45 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 61-63. 
46 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 289-288. 
47 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 299-300. 
48 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 337. 
49 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 337.  (Dominican friar Ramon Martinez Vigil and Recollect friar Salvador Font) 
50 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 337.  (Dominican friar Ramon Martinez Vigil and Recollect friar Salvador Font) 
51 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 370.   
116 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1999.  Pg. 371.   
53 Conde, Carlos H.  “Clan feuds fuel separatist violence in the Philippines, study shows.”  International 
Herald Tribune.  Oct. 26, 2007.  http://carlosconde.com/2007/10/27/clan-feuds-fuel-separatist-violence-in-
philippines-study-shows/. Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
54 Philippine-Japan Research Initiative. “Longing for Peace: A Documentation Research on the Mindanao 
and Sulu Conflict Areas.”  Ateneo Press (Unpublished Report).  Quezon City.  2008.  Pg. 6. 
55 Philippine-Japan Research Initiative. “Longing for Peace: A Documentation Research on the Mindanao 
and Sulu Conflict Areas.”  Ateneo Press (Unpublished Report).  Quezon City.  2008.  Pg. 4-5. 
56 “International Monitoring Team to Arrive in Philippines this Week.”  Agence France-Presse. Oct. 4, 
2004. Accessed Oct. 1, 2008.  (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID 
/b0de81bfd18481b8c1256f23003626ee) 
57 Niksch, Larry.  “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.”  CRS Report for 
Congress.  January 25, 2002.  Pg 2.  
58 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The International Crisis 
Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. 3.  
59 Avendano, Christine and Julie Alipala.  “Arroyo sends 4,000 soldiers to hunt Abus.”  The Philippine 
Inquirer.  Aug. 8, 2007.  
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view_article.php?article_id=81856 
60 Manaytay, Antonio.  “Police, MILF blame each other for ambush.” MindaNews.  Feb. 4, 2008.  
http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3764&Itemid=190. Accessed 
Feb. 25, 2008. 
61 Yah, Lim Chong.  Southeast Asia: The Long Road Ahead.  World Scientific Publishing.  Singapore.  
2001.  Pg 38.  
62 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 3.    
63 Wurfel, David.  “The Philippines.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George McTurnan 
Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 716. 
64 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.    
65 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.    
66 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.    
67 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 4.    
68 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.   
69 Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The Philippine 
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Balisacan and Hall (ed.). Ateneo de Manila University 
Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 80. 
70 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10.   
71 Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The Philippine 
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  
2003.  Pg. 86. 
72 Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The Philippine 
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  
2003.  Pg. 80. 
73 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 10-11.   
74 Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 36.   
117 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The Philippine 
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Balisacan and Hall (ed.). Ateneo de Manila University 
Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 85-86.  
76 Wurfel, David.  “The Political Process.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George 
McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 728. 
77 Wurfel, David.  “The Political Process.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George 
McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 728. 
78 Wurfel, David.  “The Political Process.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George 
McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 731. 
79 Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The Philippine 
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Balisacan and Hall (ed.). Ateneo de Manila University 
Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  Pg. 85-86. 
80 Yah, Lim Chong.  Southeast Asia: The Long Road Ahead.  World Scientific Publishing.  Singapore.  
2001.  Pg 38. 
81 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 115. 
82 Kerkvliet, Benedict J.T.  Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central 
Luzon Village. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  1990.  Pg. 26.  
83 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 119. 
84 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 120. 
85 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 123. 
86 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 123. 
87 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 178. 
88 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 178-80. 
89 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the Philippine Nation-
State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 178. 
90 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based Approach in 
Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science Association.  
Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 99. 
91 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based Approach in 
Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science Association.  
Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 110. 
92 National Statistical Coordination Board.  Regional Accounts.  2007 Gross Regional Domestic Product.  
Highlights.  July 28, 2008.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/grdp/2007/default.asp) 
93 National Statistical Coordination Board.  Regional Accounts.  Total Gross Regional Domestic 
Expenditures up by 7.2 percent.  Overall Performance. August 2002.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/grde/2007/default.asp) 
94 “International Monitoring Team to Arrive in Philippines this Week.”  Agence France-Presse. Oct. 4, 
2004. Accessed Oct. 1, 2008.  (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID 
/b0de81bfd18481b8c1256f23003626ee) 
95 Avendano, Christine and Julie Alipala.  “Arroyo sends 4,000 soldiers to hunt Abus.”  The Philippine 
Inquirer.  Aug. 8, 2007.  
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view_article.php?article_id=81856 
96 Manaytay, Antonio.  “Police, MILF blame each other for ambush.” MindaNews.  Feb. 4, 2008.  
http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3764&Itemid=190. Accessed 
Feb. 25, 2008. 
97 James A. Bill, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed.  Longman, 1999. 
98 William Spencer, Global Studies: Middle East, 11th ed. (Dubuque: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin Company, 
2007) 111. 
118 
                                                                                                                                                 
99 Lewis, Bernard.  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.  New York.  Random House 
Publishing.  2004.  Pg. xix.   
100 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 137. 
101 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of the 
Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science 
Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 13. 
102 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 137. 
103 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 137. 
104 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 139. 
105 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 140. 
106 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of the 
Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science 
Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 2-3. 
107 Wurfel, David.  “The Political Process.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George 
McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 727.  From Article 
VII, section 7 of the Philippine Constitution.   
108 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 105. 
109 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 141. 
110 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  
Manila.  1970.  Pg. 141-142. 
111 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of the 
Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science 
Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 3. 
112 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based Approach in 
Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science Association.  
Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 99-100. 
113 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 22-23. 
114 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 23. 
115 Wurfel, David.  “The Political Process.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George 
McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 727. 
116 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 105 
117 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University Press.  1989.  
Pg. 106. 
118 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of the 
Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political Science 
Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 13. 
119 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Philippines (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rp.html) 
120 Wurfel, David.  “The Philippines.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  George McTurnan 
Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  1964.  Pg 709.  
121 World Bank.  “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty.”   World Development Report 2000/2001.  Chapter 
Three.  Washington D.C.  Pg. 50. 
122 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Philippines.   (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/rp.html). Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
119 
                                                                                                                                                 
123 Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Philippines.   (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/rp.html). Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
124 Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board.  StatMeter.  Historical Trends of Key Indicators.  
Social Indicators.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/statmet/social.asp) 
125 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 115. 
126 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 25-26. 
127 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 115. 
128 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 123. 
129 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 26. 
130 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 26. (Cited from Ileto, Payson and Revolution, 150). 
131 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 115. 
132 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of 
the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 13. 
133 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 22.  
134 Kerkvliet, Benedict J.T.  Everyday Politics in the Philippines.  Rowan & Littlefield Publishers 
Inc.  1990.  Pg. 15.  
135 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 23. 
136 Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad 
Publishing House.  Manila.  1970.  Pg. 137. 
137 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 22. 
138 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 120. 
139 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  From “Memorandum to the Department of State.”  Merill N Abbey (ed).  
1952.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 120.   
140 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 120-121. 
141 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 118. 
142 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 118. 
143 Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State.  Manila.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  2004.  Pg. 118. 
144 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of 
the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 2. 
145 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. The Philippines.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  
(http://www.iwgia.org/sw16701.asp). 
120 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  The 
Asia Foundation.  2007. Pg. 8. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
147 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 23.  
148 Pinzon, Trina Philea.  January 20, 2008, interview with Trina Philea. Pinzon, former resident 
of Marawi City, Lanao Del Sur.  At the University of the Philippines, Diliman. 
149 Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  The 
Asia Foundation.  2007. Pg. 7. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
150 Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  The 
Asia Foundation.  2007. Pg. 8. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
151 Quimpo, Nathan G.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The weaknesses of a power-based approach 
in conflict resolution.”  Philippine Political Science Journal.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 
100-101. 
152 Ury, William L. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict.  
San Francisco.  Jossey-Bass Publications.  1988.  Pg. 14. 
153 Peck, Connie.  Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organization in 
Preventing Conflict.  Lanham.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  1998.  Pg. 22.  
154 Ury, William L. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict.  
San Francisco.  Jossey-Bass Publications.  1988.  Pg. 9. 
155 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 102-103. 
156 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 103. 
157 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 104. 
158 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 107. 
159 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 104. 
160 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 109. 
161 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 110. 
162 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 99. 
163 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 121. 
164 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 103. 
121 
                                                                                                                                                 
165 Human Rights Watch.  “Philippines:  Justice Absent in Killings and ‘Disappearances’: 
Government under review at UN Human Rights Council.”  Manila.  March 27, 2008.  Accessed 
October 1, 2008.  (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/26/philip18352.htm) 
166 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 114. 
167 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 114.  Referencing Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle’s 1972 
work “Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability.”  (Columbus, Ohio: 
Charles E. Merill).  
168 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 74-75. 
169 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  
3rd Edition.  2001.  Pg. 188. 
170 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  
3rd Edition.  2001.  Pg. 188. 
171 Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University Press.  
3rd Edition.  2001.  Pg. 186. 
172 Dougherty, James E.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive 
survey.  New York.  Longman.  4th Edition.  1997.  Pg. 218. 
173 Kwiatkowski, Lynn M.  Struggling with Development: The politics of hunger and gender in 
the Philippines.  Westview Press.  1998.  Pg. 34.   
174 Kwiatkowski, Lynn M.  Struggling with Development: The politics of hunger and gender in 
the Philippines.  Westview Press.  1998.  Pg. 33-34.   
175 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. 9. 
176 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. 2. 
177 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. 7. 
178 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 122. 
179 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. ii.  
180 Lewis, Bernard.  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.  New York.  Random 
House Publishing.  2004.  Pg. 163.   
181 Lewis, Bernard.  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.  New York.  Random 
House Publishing.  2004.  Pg. 15-16.   
182 “The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.  Pg. ii. 
183 Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale University 
Press.  1989.  Pg. 23. 
184 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of 
the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 5 and 8. 
185 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of 
the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 2. 
122 
                                                                                                                                                 
186 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 54. 
187 Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  W.W. 
Norton & Company.  2004.  Pg. 55. 
188 Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case Study of 
the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  Philippine Political 
Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  Pg. 22. 
 LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Avendano, Christine and Julie Alipala.  “Arroyo sends 4,000 soldiers to hunt Abus.”  The 
Philippine Inquirer.  Aug. 8, 2007. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines 
/nation/view_article.php?article_id =81856. 
 
Azurin, Arnold M.  Beyond the Cult of Dissidence: In Southern Philippines and Wartorn 
Zones in the Global Village.  Quezon City.  University of the Philippines Press.  
1996. 
 
Balisacan, Arsenio and Hal Hill.  The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and 
Challenges.  Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  
 
Baylis, John and Steve Smith.  The Globalization of World Politics.  Oxford University 
Press.  3rd Edition.  2001.   
 
Bello, Walden, Herbert Docena, Marissa de Guzman and Mary Lou Malig.  The Anti-
Development State. The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. 
Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines.  2004. 
 
Bill, James A.  Politics in the Middle East.  5th ed.  Longman,  1999. 
 
Bloomfield, Lincoln P and Allen Moulton.  Managing International Conflict: From 
theory to policy.  New York.  St. Martin’s Press.  1997.   
 
Budd, Eric N.  “Political Economy of Developmental and Patrimonial States: A Case 
Study of the Philippines and Indonesia.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  
Philippine Political Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.   
 
Caroll, John J. et al. “Politics and Government.” Philippine Institutions.  Solidaridad 
Publishing House.  Manila.  1970.   
 
Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Philippines.  (https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html).  Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
 
Conde, Carlos H.  “Clans Complicate Philippine Conflict.” New York Times. Asia 
Pacific Section. Oct 28, 2007. 
 
Dougherty, James E.  Contending Theories of International Relations: A comprehensive 
survey.  New York.  Longman.  4th Edition.  1997.   
 
Gochoco-Bautista and Dante Canlas.  “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy.” In The 
Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges.  Balisacan and Hall 
(ed.). Ateneo de Manila University Press.  Quezon City.  2003.  
124 
 
Goldstein, Joshua S. and John R. Freeman.  Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in 
World Politics.  Chicago.  University of Chicago Press.  1990. 
 
Gowing, Peter G.  “Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920.” Found in 
The Muslim Filipinos: Their History, Society, and Contemporary Problems by 
Robert D. McAmis.  Solidaridad Publishing House.  Manila.  1974.   
 
Griswold, Eliza.  “Waging Peace in the Philippines.”  Smithsonian Magazine.  Vol. 37.  
Issue 9.  December 2006. 
 
Human Rights Watch.  “Philippines:  Justice Absent in Killings and ‘Disappearances’: 
Government under review at UN Human Rights Council.”  Manila.  March 27, 
2008.  Accessed October 1, 2008.  (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/26 
/philip18352.htm). 
 
“International Monitoring Team to Arrive in Philippines this Week.”  Agence France-
Presse. Oct. 4, 2004. Accessed Oct. 1, 2008.   
 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. The Philippines Section.  Accessed 
October 1, 2008.  (http://www.iwgia.org/sw16701.asp). 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.”  In Classics of International 
Relations.  John A. Vasquez (ed.).  Prentice Hall.  1996.   
 
Kerkvliet, Benedict J.T.  Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations 
in a Central Luzon Village. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  1990.   
 
Kessler, Richard J.  Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines.  London.  Yale 
University Press.  1989.   
 
Kwiatkowski, Lynn M.  Struggling with Development: The politics of hunger and gender 
in the Philippines.  Westview Press.  1998.   
 
Lewis, Bernard.  The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.  New York.  Random 
House Publishing.  2004.   
 
Morgenthau, Hans J.  “A Realist Theory of International Politics.”  In Classics of 
International Relations.  John A. Vasquez (ed.).  Prentice Hall.  1996.   
 
Majul, Cecar Adib.  Muslims in the Philippines.  Quezon City.  University of the 
Philippines Press.  1999.   
 
Majul, Cecar Adib.  The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines.  Mizan 
Press.  1985. 
 
125 
Majul, Cecar Adib and Ralph Salmi, et al. Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and 
practices.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  1999. 
 
Manaytay, Antonio.  “Police, MILF blame each other for ambush.” MindaNews.  Feb. 4, 
2008.  http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task 
=view&id= 3764&Itemid=190. Accessed Feb. 25, 2008. 
 
McAmis, Robert Day.  Malay Muslims: The history and challenge of resurgent Islam in 
Southeast Asia.  Eerdmans, William B. Publishing Company.  2002. 
 
Niksch, Larry.  “Abu Sayyaf:  Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.”  
CRS Report for Congress.  2002. 
 
Peck, Connie.  Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organization in 
Preventing Conflict.  Lanham.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  1998.   
 
Philippine-Japan Research Initiative. “Longing for Peace: A Documentation Research on 
the Mindanao and Sulu Conflict Areas.”  Ateneo Press (Unpublished Report).  
Quezon City.  2008.  
 
Pinzon, Trina P.  January 20, 2008, interview with Trina P. Pinzon, former resident of 
Marawi City, Lanao Del Sur.  At the University of the Philippines, Diliman. 
 
Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert.  “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weakness of a Power-based 
Approach in Conflict Resolution.”  In Philippine Political Science Journal.  
Philippine Political Science Association.  Manila.  Vol. 21.  Number 44.  2000.  
 
Sullivan, Michael P.  Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. Persistence.  
Palgrave Macmillan.  2002.  
 
“The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao.”  The 
International Crisis Group.  Asia Report.  Number 152.  May 14, 2008.   
 
Todaro, M.P.  “Theories of Development:  A Comparative Analysis.”  In Economic 
Development in the Third World.  New York.  Longman.  1994.  
 
Torres, Wilfredo Magno III.  Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.  
The Asia Foundation.  2007. (http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=69). 
 
Ury, William L. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of 
Conflict.  San Francisco.  Jossey-Bass Publications.  1988.   
 
William Spencer, Global Studies: Middle East, 11th ed. (Dubuque: McGraw-
Hill/Dushkin Company, 2007). 
 
126 
World Bank.  “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty.”   World Development Report 
2000/2001.  Chapter Three.  Washington D.C.  
 
Wurfel, David.  “The Philippines.”  In Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.  
George McTurnan Kahin (ed.). Cornell University Press.  Ithica, NY.  2nd Edition.  
1964.  
 
Yah, Lim Chong.  Southeast Asia: The Long Road Ahead.  World Scientific Publishing.  
Singapore.  2001.   
 
Zakaria, Fareed.  The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  
W.W. Norton & Company.  2004.   
 
Zakaria, Fareed.  “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs.  Nov. 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
